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Abstract 
Epistemic beliefs refer to individual beliefs about the nature of knowledge and knowing. 
The purpose of this study was to explore the relationship between individuals’ levels of 
expertise, epistemic beliefs, and their contributions to an online community of practice. The 
studied community was hosted by a firm and consisted of members in the design professions. 
Community members (N = 315) completed a self-reported survey via the Internet. Findings 
supported a four-factor structure of design-focused epistemic beliefs, including Consistency of 
Design Knowledge, Source Authority of Design Knowledge, Attainability of Design Knowledge, 
and Contextual Factuality of Design Knowledge. However, the last two factors had low internal 
consistency. Limitations of and implications for the use of the epistemic belief questionnaire are 
further discussed. Results indicated that individuals' epistemic beliefs could be used to explain 
self-reported likelihood of sharing different levels of contributions, as well as the quality and 
quantity of individuals’ actual contributions. Individuals with weaker beliefs in Consistency of 
Design Knowledge were more likely to post comments when they found a typo, disagreed with 
information published on a help page, found relevant tips, or wanted to share tutorials they had 
created. The interaction between Consistency of Design Knowledge and levels of expertise were 
significantly associated with the self-reported likelihood of sharing low-level contributions and 
quality and quantity of actual contributions. Findings are discussed with regard to their 
implications for both theories and designs of online communities of practice.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
An online community or virtual community refers to an aggregation of people who have 
a common interest, belief, activity, or goal and who interact in a virtual environment (Brint, 
2001; Rheingold, 1994). Online communities, similar to physical communities, are distinguished 
by characteristics such as purposes, technology types, sizes, stages of development, cultures, and 
governance structures (Blanchard & Markus, 2007; Kim, 2000; Kollock & Smith, 1999; Preece, 
Maloney-Krichmar, & Abras, 2003). In this study, the discussion of communities focused on 
online communities of practice (CoPs) hosted by firms, whose purpose was to provide help and 
create learning communities for their customers. Characteristics of the studied communities are 
further explained below. 
Communities of practice, as coined by Lave and Wenger (1991), describe an activity 
system that includes groups of people who share a concern, a set of problems, or a passion about 
a topic, and who deepen their knowledge and expertise in this area by active participation and 
interaction on an ongoing basis. Less experienced members learn from experts and from 
interacting with each other. Through active engagement, members mutually negotiate and 
construct individual and collective meanings, as well as identities, and then gradually create a 
sense of community. Community members usually share similar experiences, concerns, passions, 
or the same profession (Wenger, 1998). 
Another key characteristic of the special kinds of communities of practice is that 
community members are firms’ customers. The purposes of hosting the communities include 
building relationships with customers, building brands, getting feedback from customers, 
supporting product use, and reducing customer service costs by enabling peer-to-peer problem 
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solving (Moon, 2004; Wiertz & Ruyter, 2007). If organized well, the communities may even 
influence the way that the firm provides products, so that its customers’ needs can be better 
served (Wenger, McDermott, & Snyder, 2002). With the advancement of information technology 
and social networking tools, more collaboration and social interaction can take place in virtual 
space. Many firms, such as Intel, Dell, VMware, and Lonely Planet, have paid attention to this 
trend and have tried to involve their customers in CoPs that they have created to help customers 
become more proficient at using their products or services.  
The value of online CoPs hosted by firms is dependent upon the community content and 
experts in the communities (Wenger, McDermott, & Snyder, 2002). These community materials, 
such as feature articles, blogs, videos, or discussions and answers to questions, serve as learning 
content and resources to customers. The learning content may be provided by customers, 
employees of the firm, or a variety of other partners (Wenger, McDermott, & Snyder, 2002). 
Unlike those in traditional CoPs, participants in online CoPs hosted by firms are not restricted to 
activities within the boundary of a firm. These special kinds of communities are communities in 
an extended knowledge system at the consumer level (Wenger, McDermott, & Snyder, 2002). 
Through participation in the communities, members can gain access to expertise, be better able 
to contribute to the community, and gradually move toward full participation in the communities, 
making these communities a critical mechanism for continuing professional development and 
informal learning for those in the same profession who utilize the same products and practices.  
In the current fast-changing workplace, professionals experience informal on-the-job 
training nearly everyday. It is common for professionals to use search engines to look for 
information and related learning content multiple times a day. This phenomenon has increased 
the importance of online communities of practice hosted by firms, which provide an opportunity 
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for professionals in the same field to interact with each other and share their experience and 
knowledge. These communities and the content created within them become a critical 
mechanism for continuing professional development and informal learning. Given the 
educational potential, it is essential to explore the learning opportunities within these kinds of 
communities. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
In the online CoPs hosted by firms, epistemic beliefs might be a key factor that influences 
individual’s learning process and behavior. Epistemic beliefs are individual beliefs about the 
nature of knowledge and knowing (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Epistemology is an area of 
philosophy concerned with the nature of knowledge. The primary question, from a psychological 
perspective, is how individuals come to know and how the manner of coming to know interacts 
with the cognitive processes of thinking and reasoning (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997).  
Various models have been developed since 1970. Unidimensional models were 
developed first, including Perry’s (1970) scheme of intellectual and ethical development, 
Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, and Tarule’s (1986) women’s ways of knowing, Baxter 
Magolda’s (1992) epistemological reflection model, King and Kitchener’s (1994) reflective 
judgment model, and Kuhn’s (1991) epistemological reasoning model. These models all 
described personal epistemology in a single dimension on a developmental timeline. Schommer 
(1990) proposed that personal epistemology might be characterized as a set of beliefs. The 
beliefs within the set may or may not correlate with each other. For example, an individual’s 
belief about knowledge may be more advanced than his belief about justification for knowing. 
Following Schommer’s work, many researchers have proposed different dimensions to capture 
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the nature of epistemic beliefs. Further discussion is presented in Chapter 2. This current study 
was based on the model proposed by Hofer and Pintrich (1997). Their model includes four 
theorized dimensions: certainty of knowledge, simplicity of knowledge, source of knowledge, 
and justification of knowledge. Among the four dimensions, certainty and simplicity of 
knowledge are concerned with the nature of knowledge; source and justification of knowledge 
are concerned with the nature of knowing. The definition of each dimension is presented in Table 
1.  
Table 1 
Dimensions of Hofer and Pintrich’s Model of Epistemic Beliefs 
Nature of Knowledge Nature of Knowing 
Certainty of Knowledge: Knowledge is viewed as absolute 
or contextual. 
Source of Knowledge: Knowledge is handed down by 
external authority or constructed by individuals. 
Simplicity of Knowledge: Knowledge is viewed as an 
accumulation of facts or as highly interrelated concepts. 
Justification of Knowledge: Individuals move through a 
continuum of dualistic beliefs to the multiplistic acceptance 
of opinions to reasoned justification.  
 
In their study on epistemic beliefs, Hofer and Pintrich (1997) suggested focusing on the 
contextual nature of epistemic beliefs to investigate CoPs and claimed that when people moved 
from traditional school settings to CoPs, their epistemic beliefs would be different. In this current 
study, the contextual nature of epistemic beliefs in CoPs was explored using Wegner’s (1998) 
social theory of learning to understand the effects of individuals’ levels of expertise and 
epistemic beliefs on online communities of practice hosted by firms. Proposed by Wenger (1998) 
for the purpose of understanding the learning process in CoPs, the theory has four premises: (a) 
humans are social beings; (b) “knowledge is a matter of competence with respect to valued 
enterprises” (p. 4); (c) “knowing is a matter of participating in the pursuit of such enterprises, 
that is, of active engagement in the world” (p. 4); and (d) “meaning - our ability to experience the 
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world and our engagement with it as meaningful - is ultimately what learning is to produce” (p. 
4).  
Learning in this model involves social participation (Wenger, 1998), which is the integral 
and inseparable aspect of social practice (Lave & Wenger, 1991). Participation is a process of 
being an active participant in social communications as well as constructing an identity in 
relation to these communities (Wenger, 1998). Lave and Wenger (1991) proposed the concept of 
legitimate peripheral participation (LPP) in a community of practice to explain the learning 
process. It addresses how an individual gradually moves from new-comer to old-timer in the 
community. LPP evolves from situated learning and apprenticeship, and, as a result, it has 
incorporated the characteristics of these two important learning theories. LPP addresses the 
relation between newcomers and old-timers and the way individual learners gain access to 
sources for understanding through growing involvement (Lave & Wenger, 1991).  
According to Wenger (1998), social theory of learning integrates four components to 
characterize social participation as a process of learning and knowing, including identity, 
meaning, practice, and community. Identity refers to the changes to who we are through the 
engagement in a community. This element addresses the social formation of a person. In the 
current study, individuals’ levels of expertise were measured to understand how people 
categorized who they are in the profession and what their own skill levels are. Meaning is 
constructed through the negotiation required when individuals experience the world. Through the 
process of constructing meaning, individuals form their views of knowledge and knowing. The 
meaning may be inherent in conversation, decision-making processes, problem-solving processes, 
past experiences with similar claims, formal and informal training, books, meeting notes, 
historical documents, images, or rules. There are several ways and perspectives with which to 
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empirically investigate the meaning of an individual’s work and practice. For instance, 
researchers can conduct discourse analysis to understand what and how meaning is formed. 
Social network analysis can reveal how meaning is conveyed and created. Content analysis of 
the written documents, e.g. meeting notes or email messages, can also explain how meaning is 
constructed. The current study explored whether domain-focused epistemic beliefs could be used 
to comprehend individual members’ understanding of the field. Practice happens when 
individuals are engaged in actions, negotiating meaning with each other, and developing a shared 
repertoire of resources, such as experiences and stories to solve common problems. Practice in 
this study was represented through participation in a firm-hosted online community whose 
members were all engaged in the field of design practice. Community denotes that members 
develop a sense of belonging to a group where individuals are engaged in discussion and 
knowledge-sharing. This component gives primacy to norms and rules and is concerned with 
how people share and contribute their knowledge. 
 
Statement of Problem 
There are still several issues regarding communities of practice that have not yet been 
studied in the literature. These issues fall into three main areas: challenges of knowledge 
contribution, help-seeking processes, and a lack of research investigating the relationship 
between epistemic beliefs and knowledge contributions in online CoPs.  
Challenges of knowledge contribution. 
One of the key characteristics of CoPs is engagement. The extent of members’ active 
participation in the community is one important criterion of a successful community. People who 
only observe the community are called “lurkers,” and it is common for over ninety percent of 
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online communities’ members to be lurkers (Nielsen, 2006; Preece, Nonnecke, & Andrews, 
2004). The underlying challenges that prevent people from contributing their knowledge to 
online communities have been discussed in several studies. One of the barriers is that community 
members tend to shy away from contributing knowledge because they are afraid that their posts 
may not be important or completely accurate (Ardichvili, 2008; Ardichvili, Page, & Wentling, 
2003). People are also concerned that information may be interpreted or used out of context by 
those who do not fully understand its implications (Damodaran & Olphert, 2000). Because 
lurkers think that they do not have control over the knowledge they could potentially share if 
they weren’t afraid and that they may not have other chances to explain the information they 
offer, they may hesitate to share what they know. The fear of criticism and of misleading others 
holds them back from sharing their knowledge.  
In the current research, it was hypothesized that these obstacles to active participation 
might arise from individuals’ epistemic beliefs. Though the fear of sharing inaccurate knowledge 
and concerns about misinterpretation of knowledge are both related to an individual’s belief 
about the nature of knowledge, they suggest two conflicting ideas. The fear of not sharing 
accurate knowledge implies that these individuals believe that knowledge is simple and certain, 
i.e., that there are right and wrong answers. However, concerns about misinterpretation of 
knowledge may indicate that these individuals believe that knowledge is contextual, and not 
absolute. While previous research about barriers to knowledge contribution has demonstrated a 
relationship between epistemic beliefs and knowledge contributions, those findings did not 
identify how the belief in either certain knowledge or contextual knowledge might impact 
someone’s willingness to contribute their knowledge. 
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Nevertheless, Constant, Kiesler, and Sproull (1994) have found that attitudes about 
knowledge-sharing depend on the form of knowledge. People are more likely to think that 
tacit/know-how knowledge (e.g., fixing a software bug) belongs more to its knowledge holders 
than does explicit knowledge (e.g. a computer program that the knowledge holder developed), 
and this perception influences their inclination to share knowledge. In addition, different types of 
knowledge require different ways of learning (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). For example, for 
design professionals, a better way of learning how to provide a more suitable solution to a client 
may be through discussing the case with other experienced designers, as opposed to reading a 
book about strategies and principles of how to negotiate with a client. Since ways of learning 
knowledge, a main component of epistemic beliefs, are connected to different forms of 
knowledge and different forms of knowledge are related to an individual’s perception about 
sharing knowledge, there might be a relationship between ways of learning knowledge and 
perception about sharing knowledge, which can affect knowledge contributions. However, there 
is a lack of empirical findings to support the link. 
Help-seeking process and contributing knowledge. 
Second, the importance of the current research problem was based on the previous 
research about the help-seeking process. Interaction within a community can be understood by 
examining two different types of behaviors: help-seeking and help-providing. One main purpose 
of online CoPs hosted by firms is to help current customers find information that they need. 
Hence, in these communities, a help-seeking process usually occurs before other types of 
behaviors. Nelson-Le Gall (1981) proposed that the help-seeking process includes five steps: 
becoming aware of a need for help, deciding to seek help, identifying potential helpers, using 
strategies to elicit help, and evaluating help-seeking episodes. Based on this model, Mercier 
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further developed a cognitive model of help seeking which incorporates a problem-solving 
process and integrates user’s background knowledge (Mercier & Frederiksen, 2008). Mercier 
elaborated the first two steps in Nelson-Le Gall’s model, calling it the setting of a help goal. 
Setting a help goal includes recognizing an impasse, diagnosing the impasse, and establishing a 
specific need for help. After setting a help goal, the individual would find appropriate help, 
comprehend the help, and evaluate the help. Help evaluation then becomes the feedback for 
setting another help goal, finding appropriate help, and comprehending that help. 
In fact, these two process models can also serve as decision models for contributing 
knowledge to online communities. Deciding whether or not to share knowledge and what content 
to share depends on the results of evaluating help. For example, during the evaluation, if 
individuals learn that the help they find does not work, they may decide to keep looking for help. 
In this case, one of the next steps that they may take is to post a question and share their failure 
experience of why the help did not work. In the same vein, during the evaluation process, they 
may find consistency between their experience and the help they find, or they may find some 
other useful information that has not yet been shared in the communities. In these situations, they 
may decide to share the knowledge and experience that they gained during the process. Whether 
they decide to make a knowledge contribution or not, this additional episode can become a 
source of feedback in the evaluation episode, as well as the episode of setting up a help goal, 
finding appropriate help, and comprehending help. 
Several studies on the help-seeking process have discovered an impact of epistemic 
beliefs on online searching modes and decision-making patterns (Hofer, 2004; Mason & Boldrin, 
2008; Whitmire, 2003). Aleven, Stahl, Schworm, Fischer, and Wallace (2003) also suggested 
using individual epistemic beliefs to understand how a person utilizes an interactive help system. 
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Depending on the individual’s epistemic beliefs, different types of help may be appropriate. 
Since knowledge contribution may be highly connected to help-seeking behaviors, and epistemic 
beliefs can help understanding knowledge contribution, relationships among epistemic beliefs 
and knowledge contribution are expected. However, there is a lack of empirical research 
investigating these connections.  
Lack of research on knowledge contribution in online communities of practice. 
There is a lack of research on contributing knowledge to online CoPs. Existing research 
has explored some individual factors that influence community members’ contributions. For 
instance, work experience contributes to positive attitudes about sharing expertise (Constant et 
al., 1994). Peddibhotla and Subramani (2007) found that people shared their knowledge in online 
communities usually due to two types of motivation: self-oriented motives (e.g., enhancing one’s 
own understanding of topic) and other-oriented motives (e.g., reciprocity). Self-oriented motives 
relate to better quality and lower quantity of contribution, while other-oriented motives drive 
higher quantity and lower quality of contribution. Wiertz and Ruyter (2007) indicated that 
members’ perception of the quality of content in communities had a direct effect on quantity of 
knowledge contribution.  
While several studies have indicated the influence of individual characteristics on 
contributing knowledge, there is a scarcity of research on the impact of epistemic beliefs. Only 
two related studies by Bråten and his colleagues were found (Bråten & Strømsø, 2006; Bråten, 
Strømsø, & Samuelstuen, 2005); however, their participants were undergraduate students, who 
are the typical subjects of research in the field of epistemic beliefs. More in-depth reviews are 
presented in Chapter 2. The dependent variables that they used to measure Internet 
communication were self-reported questions that asked students to answer their usage preference 
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for discussion through the Internet. These questions are still distinct from knowledge-sharing and 
contributions to online CoPs. Also, there might be a difference between self-reported questions 
and actual behaviors.  
Interaction between expertise and epistemic beliefs in knowledge contribution. 
The discussion above indicates that there is a connection between epistemic beliefs and 
contributions to online CoPs, yet there is a lack of research that investigates how that relationship 
may be influenced by an individual’s level of expertise. Given that experts/authorities are one 
source of knowledge, several theories of epistemic beliefs have included beliefs about expertise. 
A study conducted by Kuhn (1991) included the interview question, “Do experts know for sure 
what causes event A?” to investigate this type of belief. Her findings indicate that an individual 
with a less sophisticated belief regards expertise as the basis for knowing. In contrast, an 
individual with a sophisticated belief would be skeptical about expertise. Additionally, in Hofer 
and Pintrich’s model (1997), the belief about expertise is incorporated into an individual’s 
justification for knowing, which explores how the person evaluates expertise. Therefore, belief 
about expertise is considered a part of epistemic beliefs. Although individuals’ self-reported 
expertise and epistemic beliefs might be related, these two factors have not been empirically 
investigated. While several studies have pointed out that epistemic beliefs would be different for 
individuals in different grade levels1 (e.g., college students versus graduate students) (Jehng, 
Johnson, & Anderson, 1993), existing research has not studied that relationship in the context of 
community of practice.  
 
 
1 Though the grade levels are not equivalent to expertise, they are highly related. 
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Although a relationship between epistemic beliefs and expertise might exist, how the 
interaction affects knowledge contributions in an online CoP hosted by a firm is thus far 
unknown. For instance, experts might act differently in the community based on the strength of 
their belief in authority. According to the logic of the barriers to knowledge contribution reported 
by Ardichvili, Page, and Wentling (2003), if an individual with a strong belief in authority and 
expertise thinks that he is an expert in the field, he might be more likely to contribute his 
knowledge, since he has a stronger belief in himself. However, a novice with a strong belief in 
expertise might hesitate to contribute his knowledge because he thinks only experts should 
contribute their knowledge. Furthermore, an expert with a weak belief in expertise might hesitate 
to contribute because he believes knowledge can be accessed without experts or that experts are 
sometimes wrong. In summary, not only the components of expertise and epistemic beliefs, but 
also the interaction between them, are related to knowledge contributions. However, there is a 
lack of empirical research investigating these connections among epistemic beliefs, levels of 
expertise, and decisions to contribute to a community. 
 
Purpose of the Study 
As a response to the problems discussed in the previous section and the current lack of 
empirical research about them, the focus of this study was the exploration of the relationships 
among epistemic beliefs, level of expertise, and members’ contributions to an online CoP hosted 
by a firm. The analysis was focused on individuals in the community. Since this study adopted 
an instrument of epistemic beliefs developed by Hofer (2000) that was most often used in the 
context of higher education, the dimensions and structure of epistemic beliefs were re-examined.  
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Level of expertise was used because it has been indicated to be a more effective 
explanatory variable than age and education regarding information-seeking (Aleven, Stahl, 
Schworm, Fischer, & Wallace, 2003). Several scholars in the field of epistemic beliefs have also 
stated that age, gender, and grade levels might not be sufficient to explain differences in 
epistemic beliefs (Baxter Magolda, 2002; Hofer, 2004; Kuhn, 2000; Wood & Kardash, 2002). 
Therefore, the effects of age, gender, and levels of expertise on knowledge contributions were 
compared in this study, in order to better understand the relationship between epistemic beliefs 
and knowledge contributions.  
For the purpose of capturing community members’ contributions more comprehensively, 
both self-reported contributions and actual contributions to the online communities were 
observed. As suggested by Peddibhotla and Subramani (2007), the actual behaviors reflected 
both the quantity and quality of contributions.  
This study explores the following questions: 
1. What is the structure of domain-focused epistemic beliefs relative to the structure, 
stability, source, and justification of knowledge in the field of design? 
 
2. How do demographic characteristics – age, gender, expertise – relate to individual 
levels of contribution to an online community of practice hosted by a firm?  
 
3. How do individuals’ design-focused epistemic beliefs relate to their levels of 
contribution to an online community of practice hosted by a firm? 
 
4. How does the interaction between expertise and design-focused epistemic beliefs 
relate to individual levels of contribution to an online community of practice hosted 
by a firm? 
 
Based on the social theory of learning and the statement of problem, a working model of 
the potential relations between individuals’ age, gender, level of expertise, epistemic beliefs, and 
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contributions to an online community of practice hosted by a firm is proposed (see Figure 1). 
The hypotheses of the relations are presented below. First, age, gender, and level of expertise 
significantly relate to individuals’ levels of contribution to a community. Specifically, 
individuals’ levels of expertise are positively associated with contributions. The more expertise 
that individuals have, the more likely they are to contribute and to have higher quality 
contributions. Second, individuals’ design-focused epistemic beliefs relate to their level of 
contribution. Those with less belief in simple and certain knowledge, less belief about authority, 
and more belief in personally evaluating knowledge claims may have more contributions and 
higher quality contributions. In addition, there is an interaction between expertise and design-
focused epistemic beliefs in contributing to individual level of contribution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Model of the proposed relations between age, gender, levels of expertise, epistemic 
beliefs, and contributions to a community 
 
 
Significance of the Study 
A critical question that has been asked frequently by scholars in studies on communities 
of practice is how to encourage people to actively participate in a community and contribute their 
knowledge. Individual epistemic beliefs might provide a better explanation of contribution 
behavior and a new perspective for the theory of CoPs. Existing discussions on epistemic beliefs 
Age 
Gender 
Levels of Expertise 
Epistemic Beliefs 
Contributions to an online community 
of practice hosted by a firm
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in formal education settings could conceivably bring a fresh perspective to online CoPs. This 
study provided empirical findings related to the relationship between epistemic beliefs and 
formed a basis for future research. 
This study also provided empirical findings to extend the theories of epistemic beliefs to 
adult learners in a previously unexplored learning context. The traditional view has focused more 
on school-type tasks than on job or everyday tasks (Buehl, 2008). Based on her previous studies, 
Schommer (1998) posited that epistemic beliefs have a multitude of implications in on-the-job 
training. There is a lack of studies on adults within this kind of online learning and professional 
development environment. Moreover, most traditional research has studied the impact of age, 
grade level, and knowledge domain on epistemic beliefs. This research took levels of expertise 
into consideration, which might offer a more comprehensive/accurate explanation of epistemic 
beliefs.  
This study may also add new perspectives to the practice of CoPs, by identifying 
characteristics of key contributors. According to Schommer (1998), “Epistemological beliefs 
may be the critical factors that distinguish between individuals that we would want to be on our 
workforce and those that we don’t want” (p. 134). CoPs could be more active and vibrant by 
setting community policies which facilitate and encourage participation for these key 
contributors.  
Finally, this research could enhance the understanding of characteristics of online CoPs. 
Existing research has suggested that the design of online learning environments should 
correspond with individuals’ epistemic beliefs, so that individuals can gain more, learn better 
(Aleven et al., 2003; Demetriadis, Papadopoulos, Stamelos, & Fish, 2008; Windschitl & Andre, 
1998), and encounter fewer challenges while interacting with their environments (Jacobson & 
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Sprio, 1995). In other words, the various design elements of online CoPs, such as software 
environment employed (e.g., instant messenger or bulletin board) and governance structure 
chosen (e.g., norms to present people’s identity), might need to correspond to community 
members’ epistemic beliefs as well. This research provided a foundation for transferring the 
theories of epistemic beliefs to the context of online CoPs. Epistemic beliefs could be one of the 
key characteristics of online communities of practice, and this should remain in the awareness of 
these communities’ administrators. 
 
Limitations 
Although this study raised a critical issue in the area of epistemic beliefs and online 
CoPs, there were some limitations. First, web-based surveys have been adapted for use in the 
study, instead of computer-based or paper-based surveys. This method was deemed as a more 
appropriate way to collect data in this context, since participants were from all over the world, a 
typical characteristic of learners within online learning environments. This methodology might 
have led to decreased reliability and/or validity. However, Hardré, Crowson, Xie, and Ly (2007) 
tested various questionnaires on beliefs, values, perceptions and motivation with computer-
based, web-based, and paper-based administration, and found the reliabilities across 
administration conditions did not change substantially. Therefore, while it was helpful to keep 
this potential problem in mind when generating implications, it was not a serious concern in this 
study.  
Another possible limitation was the instrument used for measuring epistemic beliefs. This 
research adopted Hofer’s (2000) questionnaire; however, her questionnaire probably does not 
represent all dimensions of epistemic beliefs. As Hofer contended, the instrument could be 
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improved by adding items that allow for different ways of justification (e.g., assessment of 
expert opinion) and other sources of knowledge (e.g., individual construction of meaning). The 
focus of this current research was to provide a basis for transferring epistemic beliefs to adult 
learners in the context of online CoPs. Future research may focus on the improvement of the 
instrument for adult learners in online learning environments.  
Possible inconsistency of measurement of the quality of comments across moderators 
may pose another limitation. Measurement of the quality of comments was based on moderators’ 
judgments of their value. Although moderators took part in a two-hour training, case discussions 
with other moderators and an overview of moderator guidelines, judgments are subjective and 
might still not be reliable across moderators. The decision to adopt this measure to understand 
the quality of contributions has been made due to a consideration of efficiency. In order to 
overcome the measurement limitation, this research included other measures of contributions 
(i.e., quantity of contributions and self-reported contributions). Finally, due to self-reporting, the 
level of expertise might not be able to accurately reflect research participants’ expertise. In order 
to overcome this limitation, this research included three questions to evaluate levels of expertise. 
Through the diverse measurements of contributions and expertise, these two variables were 
expected to be represented more precisely. 
 
Definition of Terms 
An online community of practice hosted by a firm indicates an activity system which 
includes groups of people with a common interest, belief, activity, or goal who interact in a 
virtual environment across time, geographical, and organizational boundaries. This type of 
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community is hosted by firms for the purpose of helping their current customers to better use the 
firms’ services or products. 
Epistemic beliefs are defined as individual beliefs about the nature of knowledge and 
knowing (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Another similar term that has been widely used in the field is 
epistemological beliefs. According to Kitchener (2002), epistemological beliefs are beliefs about 
the field of epistemology and the study of knowledge. Since this is not the focus of the study, the 
term epistemic beliefs is adopted. 
Knowledge contribution is value-added content based on a community member’s 
knowledge (i.e. information, skills, or expertise) which is shared with the community. 
Levels of expertise are measures based on levels of experience with the software, 
frequency of software use, and years of experience in the design profession. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
In this chapter, past research on levels of expertise in the field of design and the 
relationships between levels of expertise and contributions to communities of practice is 
examined followed by recent studies on personal epistemology. Existing models of personal 
epistemology are reviewed in order to introduce the field, including unidimensional models and 
multidimensional models. In light of these multidimensional models, different instruments, their 
studied context, reliability, and validity, are discussed. These reviews then lead to the theoretical 
debate of whether the construct should be understood through domain-general, domain-focused, 
or domain-specific models. Finally, research on the influence of belief on participation in online 
activities is reviewed.  
 
Expertise and Communities of Practice 
The nature of expertise has been extensively discussed in previous studies, especially in 
the domains of chess, physics, medicine, and sports. In the following section, the nature of 
expertise, specifically in the field of design, and previous empirical findings on the relationship 
between expertise and contributions to online communities of practice are reviewed.  
Nature of expertise. 
In general, expertise develops over time as a person engages in the domain longer 
(Ericsson & Charness, 1994); the development reaches a peak then starts declining (Cross, 
2004). The peak is reached at different ages for different fields. However, not everybody can 
reach the peak (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986). Previous studies have discussed what experts know 
that novices do not. These include not only quantitative but also qualitative differences. 
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Mayer (2003) summarized four qualitative differences between experts and novices in 
physics. First, experts store domain knowledge in larger and interrelated cognitive chunks, so 
that the knowledge can be accessed more quickly and efficiently. Second, experts build more 
sophisticated representations of the problem and connect the representations to the domain 
knowledge. Third, experts sort problems based on structural similarities and principles required 
to solve them. Last but not least, experts and novices apply different strategies to solve problems. 
Experts tend to work forward from the given to the unknown conditions. In contrast, novices 
instead tend to work backward from the goal to the given. Their cognitive processes are also 
different. Experts tend to collect a larger number of examples of problems and solutions, to 
conceptualize the experience, and to store them into an abstract form. 
Based on the above differences, there are five stages of qualitative development from 
novices to experts (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986): novice, advanced beginner, competent, proficient, 
and expert. Novice starts with recognizing various context-free objective facts and features. 
These facts and rules are learned without considering context, which may cause transfer 
problems. After a novice collects considerable experience, a novice becomes an advanced 
beginner. Through practical experience, an advanced beginner can identify situational elements 
from the environment and form situational rules. He refers to both situational rules and context-
free rules to solve problems. As an advanced beginner learns more, he becomes confused about 
what is important. As a result, a competent performer develops a hierarchical process in order to 
make decisions more effectively and efficiently. By examining a situation as a set of facts, he can 
focus on specific key factors, compare plans, and determine a better plan to improve his 
performance. A proficient performer develops intuitive ability to organize tasks and to apply 
patterns in solving problems. The intuition allows the proficient performer to effortlessly connect 
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previous experiences and the new context. However, the proficient performer sometimes still 
consciously analyzes how best to do it. Unlike the proficient performer, when things develop 
normally, the expert in the last stage doesn’t make deliberative decisions. They intuitively know 
their abilities and boundaries. When time permits and outcomes are important, the expert may 
still consciously make decisions, but the process is different from that of the less experienced 
individual. The expert would critically evaluate his intuitive problem-solving process. Depending 
on their different levels of expertise, individuals require different types of learning materials 
(Kalyuga, 1998).  
Expertise in design. 
Design is a domain that concerns the complexity associated with ill-defined problems, 
requiring a continuous dialog between client and designer. However, the differences between 
experts and novices in design are similar to the differences in other fields (Purcell & Gero, 
1998). Expert designers possess more knowledge and different types of knowledge than novices. 
Qualitatively, experts store information in larger chunks which allow them to have more efficient 
and more organized cognitive processes than novices. Experts consider perceptional and 
functional features and relations between the two at the same time. In the early part of the 
problem-solving process, experts spend more time to recognize key constraints and identify 
issues in a particular design situation (Ho, 2001). Later in the problem-solving process, they 
focus more on solutions than on the problems (Atman, Chimka, Bursic, & Nachtmann, 1999). 
Experts are more likely to consider alternative solutions and use these solutions as a way of 
evaluating problems and solutions. Novices instead focus more on the specific technical features 
(such as design elements and constraints) related to an object (Calabrese & Marucci, 2006). 
When novices fail to handle a problem, they tend to redefine the problem and approach the goal 
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of this new problem (Ho, 2001). In terms of their relationship with clients, experts can more 
precisely understand constraints and are more able to take into account other stakeholders’ 
viewpoints (Bonnardel, 2000).  
Expertise and contributions in CoPs. 
Little attention has focused on how expertise is related to individuals’ contributions to 
online communities of practice. There are only two related articles that have researched 
knowledge contribution within a company and its relationship with expertise. First, Constant, 
Kiesler, and Sproull (1994) explored how different kinds of knowledge, tacit and explicit 
knowledge, influence one’s attitude of knowledge ownership and how this attitude drives sharing 
behavior. They found that work experience (years of working full time) was positively correlated 
with attitudes favoring sharing and directly predicted sharing behavior. A sample question on 
information sharing is “what is the likelihood you would share” (p. 408). The questions were 
rated on 7-point Likert scales.  
Constant, Sproull, and Kiesler (1996) further studied whether experience and expertise 
could predict the usefulness of advice. Experience included years of firm experience and years of 
experience in the computer industry. The question of expertise was “How informed are you on 
the subject matter of this question” (p. 123), and it was rated on a 10-point Likert scale 
(1=novice and 10=expert). To measure usefulness of advice, participants awarded each reply 
from $0 to $25, and they also rated whether the problem was solved. The findings indicated that 
individuals’ expertise and experience working in a firm were positively related to the usefulness 
of their reply. Both studies concluded that there was a positive relationship between expertise 
and knowledge contributions. 
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Unidimensional Models of Personal Epistemology 
From a historical perspective, unidimensional models were developed first. The first 
model was proposed by Perry (1970). Following Perry, many researchers contributed to this area, 
including Women’s Ways of Knowing by Belenky and her colleagues, Baxter Magolda’s 
Epistemological reflection Model, King and Kitchener’s Reflective Judgment Model, and Kuhn’s 
Argumentative Reasoning (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Individual beliefs in these types of models 
were characterized by a single perspective on a developmental timeline (Buehl, 2008). 
Perry scheme. 
In the early 1950s, William Perry (1970) began two longitudinal interview studies that 
explored how students made meaning of their educational experiences. In the first study, thirty-
one freshmen were interviewed. They were asked the following two questions: (1) “Would you 
like to say what has stood out for you during the year?” (2) “As you speak of that, do any 
particular instances come to mind?” In the second study, Perry and his colleagues extended and 
spelled out the sequence that they had detected in the first study, created an articulated 
developmental scheme, and tested the validity of this scheme. Based on the heuristic studies, 
they outlined this first model, addressing intellectual and ethical development. 
In Perry’s two studies, a Checklist of Educational Views (CLEV) was used in order to get 
a profile of students’ development of epistemological positions and to initiate an interview. The 
CLEV, containing 46 statements, was originally developed by Perry in 1968. Its initial purpose 
was to allow students to report their own thinking and value systems; these would then be 
compared to the development of Perry’s scheme. Students would rate to what extent they agreed 
with a statement and how difficult it was to decide their level of agreement. Shommer’s 
Epistemological Belief Questionnaire (1990) and Wood and Kardash’s Epistemological Beliefs 
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Survey (2002) have included several questions from the CLEV, such as “If professors would 
stick more to the facts and do less theorizing, one could get more out of college.” 
Perry’s model includes nine positions/stages of cognitive and affective development that 
are typically clustered into four sequential categories: dualism, multiplicity, relativism, and 
commitment within relativism. Dualism encompasses positions one and two, in which authorities 
are expected to know the truth and to convey their knowledge to the learner. In position one, an 
unquestioned view of truth exists. In position two, different perspectives are acknowledged, but 
individuals believe that knowledge is either right or wrong. Multiplicity encompasses positions 
three and four, in which students acknowledge diversity of knowledge. In position three, an 
authority remains the source of answers or the source of a method to find the answers, but in 
position four, an authority is the source of ways to think. In this position, students accept that 
most knowledge is not yet known, and that people may hold their own opinions. Relativism 
encompasses positions five and six. Individuals in this category perceive knowledge as relative, 
contingent, and contextual. In position five, students only recognize that knowledge can be 
evaluated; in position six, they further understand that they have a responsibility to make their 
own judgment. In the final category, positions seven through nine, commitments within 
relativism act as affirmations of one’s own identity (Perry, 1970). However, positions in this 
category were not clearly specified in Perry’s work (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997).  
Perry (1970) indicated that the process of growth can also be reversed. Three reverse 
conditions may happen: temporizing, retreat, and escape. Temporizing means a pause in growth 
for a year or more with hesitation to take the next step. This reversed condition may happen at 
any position. Retreat indicates that students become entrenched in dualism, positions 2 or 3, 
because they highly depend on authority. Escape means that students hold passive attitudes or 
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opportunistic alienation, when they engage in positions 4 and 5, in order to deny responsibility of 
making commitments in a relative world. In other words, Perry’s scheme is a dynamic model 
which posits change over time and movement in different directions. 
Hofer and Pintrich (1997) noted several limitations to Perry’s original study. First, the 
sample in Perry’s study was elite college students who were white males studying at Harvard 
University during the 1950s. Second, although there were three positions in commitment within 
relativism, these positions were not as clear and specified as the lower positions. Associated with 
this last point, the third limitation is a difficulty in operationalizing the scheme and evaluating 
the change of the process. This barrier is due to not only the theory’s lack of specificity, but also 
the measuring tool’s lack of efficiency. 
Benlenky et al.’s women’s ways of knowing. 
In response to the major limitation of the Perry Scheme, Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, 
and Tarule (1986) focused on the issue of women as knowers and learners. Their preliminary 
goal was to classify data on the basis of the Perry scheme; however, the lack of fit led them to 
develop a new scheme of five epistemic perspectives. Their samples were selected from two 
different populations: Ninety women were students from one of six diverse academic 
institutions, and forty-five women were participants in family agencies where they were seeking 
information about parenting. Their interview protocols were composed of sections on gender 
roles, relationships, education, real-life moral dilemmas, and ways of knowing based on the 
frameworks of Perry, Gilligan, and Kohlberg (Belenky et al., 1986).  
There are five perspectives on women’s ways of knowing. Silence, the first perspective, 
refers to a voiceless and passive existence. External authority represents the absolute truth. In the 
next perspective, received knowledge, women believe that they are capable of receiving and 
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reproducing knowledge. The source of this knowledge is derived from authority, and there is 
only one right answer. This perspective is parallel to dualism in the Perry scheme (Hofer & 
Pintrich, 1997). Women in subjective knowledge, the third perspective, believe themselves to be 
the sources of truth; truth and knowledge are perceived subjectively. This position is similar to 
Perry’s multiplicity. In the next position, procedural knowledge, women adopt objective and 
systematic perspectives. This position includes separate knowing and connected knowing, which 
denotes the relationships between knowers and the objects/subjects of knowing. Separate 
knowers assume everyone may be wrong, and that they themselves have the obligation to 
examine ideas critically. Connected knowers believe that the most trustworthy knowledge comes 
from personal experience, so they develop procedures for gaining access to other people’s 
knowledge. This position is similar to relativism within the Perry scheme. Constructed 
knowledge, the fifth position, refers to an integration of subjective and objective ways of 
knowing. Knowers are actively involved in the process of knowledge construction; as a result, 
knowledge and truth are contextual. This is aligned with the last position in the Perry scheme, 
commitment within relativism. 
Compared with Perry’s study, Belenky et al. (1986) expanded the understanding of 
epistemic beliefs by emphasizing the source of knowledge and truth. One of the criticisms of 
Belenky et al. (1986) is that the exclusively female samples did not provide a valid method to 
evaluate the gender-related nature of the findings. Additionally, the inclusion of women who 
were not in school makes it difficult to draw meaningful conclusions about the differences in 
ways of knowing between genders (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). 
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Baxter Magolda’s epistemological reflection model. 
Unlike the studies done by Perry (1970) and Belenky et al. (1986), Baxter Magolda 
(1992) conducted a longitudinal interview study with both male and female college students, so 
that gender-related patterns were observed in her model. She began with 101 students from 
Miami University in Ohio, including 51 females and 50 males. Eighty students participated 
through their four years of college, seventy of them kept participating after graduating from 
college, and 39 remained through year 12. During the college interview, the study addressed six 
areas: the individual’s role as a learner, the role of instructors and peers in learning, the 
individual’s perception of evaluation of his or her work, the nature of knowledge, and 
educational decision-making. In the post-college phase, the interview continued to explore how 
participants learn and come to learn. The participants were asked to think about important 
learning experiences that had taken place since the previous interview and to reflect on these 
experiences. 
The structure of the epistemological reflection model also coincides with Perry’s and 
Belenky et al.’s perspectives. Compared with Belenky et al., Baxter Magolda (1992) also found a 
similar structure of personal epistemology between men and women. However, she did indicate 
gender-related patterns within each position. Absolute knowers believe that those in authority 
have all the answers. Peers can only share and explain materials to each other. There are two 
patterns in the position of absolute knowers, a receiving pattern and a mastery pattern. Receiving 
pattern knowers, who are primarily women, acquire knowledge through listening and recording 
information. On the contrary, mastery pattern knowers, primarily men, acquire knowledge 
through active involvement to remember the material. Transitional knowers, the second position, 
accept the uncertainty characteristics of knowledge. For example, transitional knowers believe 
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that math and science are certain and the humanities and the social sciences are uncertain. These 
knowers believe that teachers and evaluations in the uncertain area should focus on 
understanding the knowledge rather than memorizing it. There are also two patterns in this 
position, an interpersonal pattern and an impersonal pattern. Interpersonal pattern knowers, 
primarily women, prefer to learn in the uncertain areas and focus on sharing views. Impersonal 
pattern knowers, primarily men, focus on defending their views and being challenged to think. 
Independent knowers believe each individual has his or her own truth. This third position 
includes an interindividual pattern for the majority of women and an individual pattern for the 
majority of men. Interindividual pattern knowers value others’ views and may change their views 
accordingly; individual pattern knowers struggle to hear others’ views. Contextual knowers, 
similar to the last position in the Perry scheme, are capable of applying knowledge in particular 
contexts and making judgments based on evidence. This position often appears after graduating 
from college; at this point, gender-related differences also decrease.  
Baxter Magolda (1992) also indicated three distinct phases within contextual knowing 
that emerged in the post-college interviews. First, individuals use external formulas, e.g., others’ 
perceptions, to decide what to believe. Second, in search of internal authority, individuals reach 
a point of developing their internal authority and a sense of self that could be influenced but not 
overwhelmed by others’ perceptions and approval. One participant in this study took three years 
after college to come to this phase. In the third phase, individuals focus on establishing an 
internal foundation of belief for self-authorship during their late twenties and early thirties. 
Those in this phase acquire some principles by interacting with others. These principles serve as 
the core from which his or her life and decisions operate (Baxter Magolda, 2002). 
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The epistemological reflection model is focused more on the nature of learning in the 
development of adulthood from ages 18 to 30. Baxter Magolda provided solid descriptions of 
learning in the post-college years, including learning in the workplace and learning from 
interactions with family members. She suggested that this study had not yet been completed. 
Future research is needed to continue tracing development into adulthood (Baxter Magolda, 
2002). Additionally, similar to a limitation in Perry’s study, the sample in Baxter Magolda’s 
study was also composed of a mostly white and middle-class sample. The extent to which this 
epistemic development transfers to other populations requires further examination. 
King and Kitchener’s reflective judgment model. 
King and Kitchener created the Reflective Judgment Model based on the work of Perry 
and John Dewey (King & Kitchener, 1994). The model is defined as “the development of 
complex reasoning in late adolescents and adults, and how the epistemic assumptions people 
hold are related to the way they make judgments about ill-structured issues” (King & Kitchener, 
2004, p. 5). They conducted a ten-year longitudinal and cross-sectional interview study with 
individuals ranging from high school students to middle-aged adults (King & Kitchener, 1994). 
A wide-variety of students and nonstudent subgroups were studied. They developed an extensive 
interview protocol, the Reflective Judgment Interview (RJI), to explore individuals’ foundational 
assumptions concerning knowledge and how it is gained. In the protocol, five standard issues 
were included, including how human beings were created, how the pyramids were built, etc. 
These issues guided conversations about the probe questions, which were focused on how a 
respondent arrived at a point of view, how certain he or she was about this perspective, how he 
or she assessed alternative interpretations, and how he or she made sense of an authority’s 
perspective. 
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The reflective judgment model is a developmental stage model (King & Kitchener, 2002) 
with seven qualitatively different stages. Both the view of knowledge and the concept of 
justification are explained in each stage. The seven stages can be further categorized into three 
periods: prereflective (Stages 1 to 3), quasi-reflective (Stages 4 to 5), and reflective (Stages 6 to 
7). As mentioned in the review by Hofer and Pintrich (1997), the prereflective period is similar 
to the initial positions in previously mentioned models; the quasi-reflective period is similar to 
Perry’s multiplicity and relativism; and the final period is close to commitment within relativism.  
In the first stage, knowledge is absolute, not understood as an abstraction, and can be 
acquired by direct observation. Beliefs need no justification; alternate beliefs are not perceived. 
King and Kitchener (2002) concluded that this stage is rare and only happens in the youngest 
high school samples. The second stage, similar to Perry’s dualism, hypothesizes that knowledge 
is obtained through authorities. Stage three accepts that knowledge can be temporarily uncertain; 
in this area, beliefs are defended as personal opinion. Stage four, similar to multiplicity, states 
that knowing always involves an element of ambiguity, and justification is achieved by means of 
giving reasons and using evidence. In stage five, which is similar to relativism, knowledge is 
contextual and subjective, and beliefs are justified through the rules of inquiry within a particular 
context. In stage six, knowledge is constructed into individual conclusions, and justification is 
reached by comparing evidence and opinions from different perspectives. The last stage is 
characterized by the use of critical inquiry and probabilistic justification to guide knowledge 
construction. 
The reflective judgment model is particularly noteworthy for its in-depth research on 
views of knowledge and justification for ill-structured problems. It also makes unique 
contributions in its elaboration of the upper levels of Perry’s scheme. However, the interview 
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protocol did not provide a good way to explain development in the post-college period. As a 
result, the researchers were not able to specify how the development stages are related to real-
world job and family problems, even though they interviewed participants in their post-college 
periods. Another limitation is that only trained raters are permitted to utilize the reflective 
judgment interview, which is too time- and money-consuming (King & Kitchener, 2004; Hofer 
& Pintrich, 1997). This becomes a barrier to wider use; therefore, scholars in this area have 
started to focus on developing other assessment instruments, such as the Reasoning about 
Current Issues test (RCI) (King & Kitchener, 2004, Wood, Kitchener, & Jensen, 2002). 
Kuhn’s epistemological reasoning in everyday life. 
Similarly to King and Kitchener, Kuhn (1991) also questioned how individuals respond 
to ill-structured problems, but she focused on argumentative reasoning for everyday, real-life 
problems. Subjects were asked to generate causal explanations for the following social problems: 
(a) What causes prisoners to return to crime after they’re released?; (b) what causes children to 
fail in school?; and (c) what causes unemployment? She interviewed individuals from four age 
groups: teens, 20s, 40s, and 60s. There were 40 participants in each age group, and gender and 
educational levels were equally distributed. There were two interview meetings for each subject, 
each of which took about 45 to 90 minutes. The interviews took place in the participants’ homes 
or work environments. Similar to King and Kitchener’s interview protocol, for each issue Kuhn 
included questions regarding proof (e.g., “Could someone prove that you were wrong?”), 
expertise (e.g., “Do experts know for sure what causes xxx?”), multiple viewpoints, origins of 
theories, and certainty of one’s own perspective. 
Kuhn’s model included three categories of epistemic views: absolutist (similar to Perry’s 
dualism), multiplist (similar to Perry’s multiplicity), and evaluative (similar to Perry’s relativism) 
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(Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). The absolutist believes that knowledge is objective and certain, and is 
derived from an external reality and authority. At the multiplist level, knowledge is comprised of 
opinions chosen by their holders and is not open to challenge. The evaluativist recognizes that 
opinions can be compared and evaluated through a framework of alternatives, evidence, and 
arguments in order to assess relative merits. 
Another study performed by Kuhn and her colleagues in 2000, applied a quantitative 
method to evaluate an individual’s level of epistemic understanding. They asked 2 questions for 
15 items; each item contained a pair of contrasting statements from two individuals, Robin and 
Chris. The two questions were: (a) “Can only one of their views be right, or could both have 
some rightness?” and (b) If subjects selected “both could be right,” they then asked “Could one 
view be better or more right than the other?” (Kuhn, Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000, p. 316). The 
15 items consisted of three questions in each of the following domains: judgments of personal 
taste, aesthetics, value judgments, truth about the social world, and truth about the physical 
world. They found that the transition between the three categories of epistemic views may not 
happen simultaneously across different domains; personal taste and aesthetics usually come first, 
and truth judgments change last. This study concluded that domain matters in individuals’ 
epistemic beliefs. They contended that merely considering age and education are not sufficient to 
explain the transition to an evaluativist level. Interestingly, most of the adults made the transition 
from an absolutism to a multiplist view, but less than half transformed from a multiplist to an 
evaluativist view.  
Most previous studies and theories were discussions focused on college students, and 
there remained minimal understanding about how adults change their beliefs. If it is assumed that 
adults have already reached the highest levels development and their beliefs are stable, there is 
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no need to conduct further studies to understand adults’ epistemic beliefs and how the beliefs 
correspond with behaviors. However, findings from Kuhn, Cheney, and Weinstock indicate that 
not all adults reach the highest level of epistemic beliefs, and their beliefs may not be the same 
across different domains. There is a need for further study of adults’ beliefs on epistemology.  
Kuhn’s work is particularly noteworthy for its elaboration of the connection of epistemic 
theories to real-world reasoning and its explanation of the connection of epistemic beliefs to 
different domains. Hofer and Pintrich (1997) criticized discrepancies between Kuhn’s interview 
protocol and the three levels in the epistemological reasoning model. The questions that Kuhn 
asked addressed proof, expertise, multiple viewpoints, origins of theories, and certainty; 
however, the assignment of responses and analyses were only based on expertise questions. 
Additionally, Hofer and Pintrich suggested that strength of argument, origins of theories, and 
attitudes toward the topic should be further explored. 
Summary. 
Table 2 provides a summary of unidimensional models of personal epistemology. There 
are similar developmental positions across these five models (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Perry’s 
dualism is close to Belenky et al.’s silence, Baxter Magolda’s abosolute knowing, King and 
Kitchener’s pre-reflective thinking, and Kuhn’s absolutists. Similarly, Perry’s multiplicity is 
close to Belenky et al.’s subjective knowledge, Baxter Magolda’s transitional knowing, and 
Kuhn’s multiplists. Relativism is parallel to Belenky et al.’s procedural knowledge, Baxter 
Magolda’s independent knowing, and Kuhn’s evaluatists. King and Kitchener’s quasi-reflective 
thinking has characteristics from both multiplicity and relativism. Commitment within 
relativism, the highest category, is similar to Belenky et al.’s constructed knowledge, Baxter 
Magolda’s contextual knowing, and King and Kitchener’s reflective thinking.  
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Besides, different models still have various foci. Perry planted the seed of researching 
epistemic beliefs and initiated the developmental model. Since Perry’s model had a limitation of 
excluding females, Belenky et al. and Baxter Magolda focused on women’s ways of thinking and 
gender comparisons. Baxter Magolda compared both men and women’s beliefs about knowledge 
and knowing and concluded that there is no difference between the developmental positions, but 
that women and men possess different patterns of knowing. King and Kitchener turned their 
focus toward reasoning and judgment processes about ill-structured issues and elaborated the 
upper levels of development of epistemic beliefs. Kuhn also examined reasoning processes about 
ill-structured problems, but focused on real-life problems which individuals might face in 
everyday life. Kuhn is also the first scholar who explored epistemic beliefs in a wide range of 
ages and found that age is not a sufficient explanatory variable regarding differences in epistemic 
beliefs. The findings from both Baxter Magolda and Kuhn suggest that future research is needed 
to continue tracing development into adulthood. Findings from King and Kitchener as well as 
Kuhn indicated that epistemic beliefs may be different within an individual across domains and 
topics.  
Research methods used by these studies are mostly interviews and the analysis of 
journals (Bråten, 2008). These qualitative methods can capture rich details and elaborations of 
epistemic beliefs; however, the implications are limited due to the small sample size and are both 
labor and cost intensive (Wood & Kardash, 2002). Some instruments can only be conducted by 
trained raters, such as the reflective judgment interview from King and Kitchener. Although 
quantitative instruments have been developed in some unidimensional models, such as Perry’s 
CLEV, King and Kitchener’s RCI, and Kuhn’s instrument, they are still not widely used.  
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Table 2 
Summary of Unidimensional Models of Personal Epistemology 
Author(s), Year Subjects Models 
Relationships with  
other variables 
Perry, 1970 I: 31 Ungrd 
II: 109 Ungrd were 
recruited in their first 
year. 67 completed four-
year reports. 
Four categories 
 Dualism 
 Multiplicity 
 Relativism 
 Commitment within relativism 
Three reverse conditions 
Temporizing, retreat, and escape 
 
Not available: The majority was 
White, elite, and male college 
students. 
Belenky, 
Clinchy, 
Goldberger, & 
Tarule, 1986 
Two samples all female: 
90 from academic 
institutions and 45 from 
those who participated in 
family agencies  
Women’s Ways of Knowing  
 Silence 
 Received knowledge 
 Subjective knowledge 
 Procedural knowledge: Separate knowing and 
connected knowing 
 Constructed knowledge 
 
The five perspectives are similar to 
Perry’s male-focused model, but 
there is no sufficient evidence to 
support the similarity of 
development of personal 
epistemology between genders. 
 
Baxter 
Magolda, 1992 
101 Ungrd to postcollege, 
12 years in total. 
Epistemological reflection Model 
 Absolute knowing: Receiving or mastery pattern 
 Transitional knowing: Interpersonal or 
impersonal pattern 
 Independent knowing: Interindividual or 
individual pattern 
 Contextual knowing 
 
Ways of knowing were not 
different between genders, but 
gender-related patterns in knowing 
were found. 
King and 
Kitchener, 
1994 
Secondary students, 
Ungrd, grad, and 
nonstudent adults 
Reflective Judgment Model 
 Prereflective 
 Quasi-reflective 
 Reflective 
 
Students from social science 
programs scored higher than those 
in math programs. 
Kuhn, 1991 Teens, 20s, 40s, and 60s Epistemological reasoning in everyday life 
 Absolutists 
 Multiplists 
 Evaluatists 
Transition may not happen 
simultaneously across different 
domains. Considering only age and 
education did not explain the 
transition process well.  
 
 
Multidimensional Models and Measurements of Personal Epistemology 
The previously reviewed models are all unidimensional. Although different aspects had 
been addressed, e.g., the role of authority and the concept of justification, they were all treated as 
one single component to define positions on a developmental scale. Schommer (1990, 1992) 
pioneered the multidimensional conceptualization to examine how epistemic beliefs are related 
to academic cognitive and learning performance. The important breakthrough of Schommer’s 
model is that five proposed distinct factors may or may not develop synchronously (Duell & 
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Schommer-Alkins, 2001). People may believe that knowledge is handed down by authority and 
be uncertain at the same time; these beliefs may be more or less independent. By conceptually 
transforming the model from unidimensional to multidimensional, she was able to develop a 
quantitative, multi-dimensional measurement of a person’s epistemology, which brings an 
expedient alternative to interviews. 
Schommer’s multidimensional models. 
In contrast to Perry’s scheme, Schommer (1990) proposed that epistemic beliefs may be 
characterized as a set of independent beliefs. These beliefs are orthogonal and may present 
variations within individuals. These attributes function conjointly to shape epistemic beliefs. 
Students can be sophisticated in one belief and less sophisticated in another. This perspective is 
considerably different from Perry’s category of epistemic beliefs, which contains progression 
levels and distinct borders between positions. 
Schommer (1990) developed a self-report questionnaire with 63 items that measured 
epistemic beliefs along five dimensions. She initially hypothesized a five-factor model of 
epistemic beliefs: control of learning, speed of learning, structure of knowledge, stability of 
knowledge, and omniscient authority. There are two or more subsets of items within each 
dimension. Control of learning refers to the ability to learn as it is genetically determined rather 
than enhanced through education and experience; for instance, “An expert is someone who has a 
special gift in some area.” Speed of learning is described as the belief that learning is quick or 
gradual; for example, “Successful students learn things quickly.” Structure of knowledge 
characterizes the view that knowledge is organized as isolated facts rather than interrelated and 
integrated conceptions; for instance, “Most words have one clear meaning.” Simplicity of 
knowledge characterizes the view that belief about knowledge is certain and absolute rather than 
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tentative and evolving; for example, “I don’t like the movies that don’t have an ending.” 
Omniscient authority suggests that knowledge is handed down by authority rather than being 
derived from reason; for instance, “How much a person gets out of school depends on the quality 
of the teacher.” Factor analysis was conducted to determine which factors could represent the 
construct better. Schommer (1990) found that omniscient authority was the only one that did not 
form a factor.  
After Schommer published her paper in 1990, many researchers followed her steps and 
modified the instrument or created new instruments based on her multidimensional model. Hofer 
and Pintrich (1997) found that two of the five factors, fixed ability and quick learning, appear to 
concern the nature of intelligence and beliefs about learning. These are not typical areas of 
epistemology. From a philosophical stance, epistemology is a study of the nature of knowledge 
and justification of beliefs (Derose, 2005; Steup, 2005). It addresses the following questions: 
“What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge? What are its sources? What is 
its structure?” (Steup, 2005, para. 1), and “What makes beliefs justified?” (Steup, 2005, para. 8). 
The unidimensional models introduced above only address the nature of knowledge and 
knowing. Hofer (2001) suggested that the construct of personal epistemology should only 
discuss beliefs about “the definition of knowledge, how knowledge is constructed, how 
knowledge is evaluated, where knowledge resides, and how knowledge occurs” (p. 355). 
According to the philosophical stance of epistemology and the construct in unidimensional 
models, the nature of intelligence and learning are not typically a part of the study of 
epistemology. Hofer and Pintrich (1997) proposed that beliefs about knowledge and knowing 
serve as a precursor that influences individuals’ beliefs about learning and the whole learning 
process.  
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Hofer and Pintrich (1997) indicated that the two factors, fixed ability and quick learning, 
are part of an implicit theory of intelligence. This is a possible reason why the subset of “learning 
is quick” was also loaded on innate learning. Although these factors are probably related to 
beliefs of epistemology, they are different constructs and should be separated. Therefore, Hofer 
and Pintrich introduced a model of personal epistemology only concerning the nature of 
knowledge and knowing. The nature of knowledge includes certainty of knowledge (from 
absolute to contextual to relativism) and simplicity of knowledge (from simple to complex). The 
nature of knowing includes the source of knowledge (from reliance on authority to self 
construction) and the justification for knowing (acceptance of facts to critical reevaluation of 
expertise and context). Although this model proposed by Hofer and Pintrich is cited widely in the 
literature, the model is under-implemented and under-tested. 
Due to methodological limitations of the unidimensional model, Schommer’s work has 
attracted a great deal of attention from researchers in this field. Several studies have applied this 
idea by either improving Schommer’s instrument or developing new instruments in order to 
serve their particular needs. The following section presents diverse instruments and provides 
comparisons of their validity and reliability. For the purpose of this dissertation, only English 
instruments are reviewed. The discussion also does not include those domain-specific 
instruments, such as internet-specific epistemic beliefs (Bråten et al., 2005) or the beliefs 
specifically related to mathematics and history (Buehl & Alexander, 2005). 
Schommer’s epistemological questionnaire (EQ). 
Based on Perry’s (1968) and Ryan’s (1984) work, Schommer developed the 
epistemological questionnaire with 12 subsets and 63 items for five dimensions: simple 
knowledge, certain knowledge, omniscient authority, innate ability, and quick learning. Simple 
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knowledge had two subsets, seek single answers and avoid integration; certain knowledge 
included two subsets, avoid ambiguity and knowledge is certain; omniscient authority included 
two subsets, don’t criticize authority and depend on authority; innate ability had three subsets, 
can’t learn how to learn, success is unrelated to hard work, and ability to learn is innate; and 
quick learning had three subsets, learning is quick, learn first time, and concentrated effort is a 
waste of time. The questionnaire included 28 negative items and 35 positive items. Students 
rated their degree of agreement with each statement on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree). Schommer (1990) conducted an exploratory factor analysis of the 12 subsets 
with a principal factoring extraction and orthogonal varimax rotation. The four factors, excluding 
omniscient authority, emerged and accounted for 55.2 percent of the variance. An eigenvalue 
greater than one is a cutoff point for factors, and a factor loading greater than .5 is a criteria for 
selecting items.  
However, in Schommer and her colleagues’ replication study (Schommer, Crouse, & 
Rhodes, 1992), they did not obtain a similar structure. They conducted the research with similar 
subjects and only successfully extracted 3 factors. Next, they forced a 4-factor structure, which 
resulted in similar results; however, the subsets within each factor were somewhat different. 
First, the label of innate ability was changed to externally controlled learning, since the subset of 
“learn first time” was not loaded and “concentrated effort is a waste of time” was loaded. 
Second, the subset of “depend on authority” was not loaded on any factors in 1990, but it was 
loaded on the factor of simple knowledge in 1992. Third, both “don’t criticize authority” and 
“knowledge is certain” were loaded on the factor of certain knowledge, but only “knowledge is 
certain” was loaded in 1990. According to confirmatory factor analysis, they compared the 3-
factor structure that they first extracted from the 1992 work and the 4-factor structure from 1990 
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work. They concluded that the 4-factor structure has a better fit, based on goodness-of-fit index, 
adjusted goodness-of-fit, and chi-square.  
In addition to college students, Schommer and her colleagues (Schommer, 1993; 
Schommer, Calvert, Gariglietti, & Bajaj, 1997) also modified the questionnaire for secondary 
students. For example, they changed the word “theory” to “idea.” They found a similar 4-factor 
structure also existed for high school students. Epistemic beliefs accounted for learning 
performance through both the cross-sectional study (Schommer, 1993) and the longitudinal study 
(Schommer et al., 1997). They concluded that students in higher grades had more sophisticated 
beliefs and girls were less likely to believe in quick learning and fixed ability.  
Schommer-Aikins, Brookhart, and Hutter (2000) further extended the use of the 
epistemological questionnaire to 7th and 8th grade middle school students. Based on her work in 
1990, 31 items were used in the 4-factor structure. They piloted these 31 questions to middle 
school students and concluded a 30-item epistemological questionnaire on the basis of their 
screening process. Confirmatory factor analysis applied to a random half of the sample 
concluded that the four-factor structure was not a good fit, so the researchers removed items with 
small factor loadings and a small correlation with other items within factors. This refinement 
resulted in a 3-factor structure with stability of knowledge, speed of learning, and ability to learn. 
In 2005, Schommer-Aikins, Duell, and Hutter again used the same 30 items with middle school 
students. They conducted an exploratory factor analysis; the extract method was not specified. 
Based on the analysis and a scree plot, they found a 4-factor structure which was different from 
the structure they concluded in 2000. The new 4-factor structure included two old factors, quick 
learning and certain knowledge, and two new labels, studying aimlessly and omniscient 
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authority. These two studies indicated that students’ beliefs in learning were related to their GPA 
and their domain-specific epistemic beliefs.  
Schommer’s epistemological questionnaire was validated for different educational levels. 
It is currently the most prevailing instrument of epistemic beliefs and is utilized for diverse 
purposes. However, some problems regarding the instrument and item validity as well as 
instrument reliability had been indicated in other studies. The issues include a low internal 
consistency within factors (Debacker, Crowson, Beesley, Thoma, & Hestevold, 2008), vague 
remnants of personality measurement with questionable relevance to indicators of beliefs about 
knowledge, and inconsistency of phrasing of items (e.g., first-person, second-person, and third-
person format) (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997).  
Jehng et al.’s epistemological questionnaire (JEQ). 
Based on Schommer’s framework, Jehng, Johnson, and Anderson (1993) developed a 
new instrument, comprising five factors: certainty of knowledge, omniscient authority, orderly 
process, innate ability, and quick learning. The simple knowledge in Schommer’s work was 
replaced by Orderly Process, which was defined as “the learning process [that] tends to be 
regular rather than irregular” (p. 26, Jehng et al., 1993). Twenty-seven students participated in 
their pilot study and were required to rate whether each statement was understandable. They also 
validated the content validity of the scale through a panel discussion with three university faculty 
members. The questionnaire resulted in 51 items through these two steps.  
They first conducted Cronbach’s α reliability and eliminated 10 items with a coefficient 
smaller than .1, which indicated that those items were inconsistent with others and they might 
decrease the entire reliability of the instrument. Then they conducted a discrimination power 
which indicated that seven items had low discrimination capability. As a result, 34 items were 
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used for final analysis. According to the results from LISREL analysis, also known as 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), they concluded that the findings supported a 
multidimensional characteristic of epistemic beliefs. The criteria they used for deciding whether 
the model was good were not reported.  
In addition, they used this questionnaire to compare students from different disciplines 
and different academic levels through MANOVA. Students in the arts and social sciences were 
more likely than business and engineering students to believe that knowledge is uncertain, 
knowledge is best acquired from independent reasoning, and learning is not an orderly process. 
Graduate students were more likely than undergraduates to believe that knowledge is uncertain, 
knowledge is best acquired from independent reasoning, and learning is not an orderly process. 
Schraw et al.’s epistemic belief inventory (EBI). 
Schraw, Dunkle, and Bendixen (1995) modified Schommer’s questionnaire and 
developed a new instrument with five dimensions of epistemic beliefs, including certain 
knowledge, simple knowledge, omniscient authority, quick learning, and fixed ability. They 
indicated several theoretical and methodological issues and challenges for applying Schommer’s 
questionnaire (Schraw, Bendixen, & Dunkle, 2002). One issue was that Schommer had difficulty 
identifying one of the important hypothesized factors, namely, omniscient authority; however, 
the factor was observed in all five unidimensional models. Additionally, there were 63 items in 
Schommer’s questionnaire and 51 items in Jehng et al.’s questionnaire. The long instrument may 
have easily exhausted respondents and further influenced the reliability of their responses. The 
goal of the new questionnaire was to overcome these two issues and create a shorter but still 
complete set of epistemic beliefs.  
 43 
This inventory contains 32 items, including 26 new items and 6 items reworded from 
Schommer’s (1990) items. From the exploratory factor analysis, they successfully extracted five 
factors, including simple knowledge, certain knowledge, omniscient authority, fixed ability, and 
quick learning. These factors all have an eigenvalue over one. According to factor loadings, they 
selected those items with loadings over .3 and cross-loading smaller than .3; this resulted in 16 
items for their later analysis of the relationships between epistemic beliefs and performance on 
well-defined and ill-defined problems. They concluded that epistemic beliefs were related to 
performance on the ill-defined tasks but not the well-defined tasks. 
Hofer’s discipline-focused epistemological beliefs questionnaire (DEBQ). 
In Hofer and Pintrich’s (1997) extensive reviews on models of personal epistemology, 
they concluded that beliefs of learning and intelligence do not seem to be comprised within the 
personal epistemology model. Details are discussed on page 34 to 36. They proposed that only 
four dimensions should be contained in the model, including certainty of knowledge, simplicity 
of knowledge, source of knowledge, and justification for knowing. Separating these beliefs from 
both the domain-general and domain-specific measurement of epistemic beliefs may provide 
clarification to the research and theories in the field. Following this conclusion, Hofer (2000) 
developed the discipline-focused epistemological beliefs questionnaire. This questionnaire 
encompassed new items created by Hofer and items that were adapted from Perry’s checklist of 
educational values and Schommer’s EQ.  
The questionnaire included 27 items with a 5-point scale. Principal components and 
maximum likelihood factoring of items with varimax rotation were conducted. Four factors were 
extracted meaningfully: comprising certain/simple knowledge; justification for knowing: 
personal; source of knowledge: authority; and attainability of truth. Certain and simple 
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knowledge do not result in two separate factors, as in Schommer’s (1990) and Jehng et al.’s 
(1993) findings; however, this finding is consistent with Qian and Alvermann (1995). 
Additionally, Hofer created two labels with more narrow definitions. First, justification for 
knowing: personal represents that knowing is justified by individual opinion or firsthand 
experience. Because the factor does not comprise other ways for justification, such as evaluation 
of evidence or assessment of expert opinion, Hofer highlighted the characteristic of personal in 
the label. Second, source of knowledge: authority refers to expert knowledge, texts, and other 
external authority as the source of knowledge. Because the factor does not comprise other 
sources, such as individual construction of meaning, she labeled authority in the factor. 
Concerning the last factor, attainability of truth, Hofer (2000) contended it did not usually 
emerge as a single factor in other studies. She suggested that future research is required to see 
how consistently this factor appears. The factor was later found in the study of Wood and 
Kardash (2002). 
Wood and Kardash’s epistemological beliefs survey (EBS). 
In Wood and Kardash’s (2002) discussion of measurement issues, they reported that 
Schommer’s questionnaire always analyzed using the 12 subsets rather than the 63 items as 
variables. This level of analysis added variability to each factor. Additionally, these subsets did 
not consistently load on the four factors that they extracted and some subsets cross-loaded on 
other factors. For instance, “Avoid ambiguity” was hypothesized as a subset for certain 
knowledge, but it was loaded on simple knowledge instead (Schommer, 1990). The factor of 
“Omniscient authority” consistently did not emerge as one factor, and it appeared to load on 
simple knowledge in 1992. Jehng et al. (1993) also did not analyze how the complete 51 items 
loaded on the five factors that they hypothesized.  
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For these reasons, Wood and Kardash (2002) combined Schommer’s and Jehng’s 
questionnaires and attempted to see how these 80 items loaded on factors from the empirical 
data. Duplicate items were removed. They found similar patterns using maximum likelihood, 
principal components, and by generalizing the least squared extractions with a promax rotation. 
Maximum likelihood extraction with varimax, oblimin, quartimax, and promax rotations also 
yielded the same general pattern of loadings.  
They concluded that the best fit was a five-factor structure, comprising speed of 
knowledge acquisition, structure of knowledge, knowledge construction and modification, 
characteristics of successful students, and attainability of truth. Speed of knowledge acquisition 
indicates that learning is a quick or gradual process. Structure of knowledge indicates that 
knowledge is either discrete and unambiguous or complex and interrelated. Low scores of 
knowledge construction and modification represent that knowledge is certain, passively received, 
and accepted without questioning; high scores represent that knowledge is constantly evolving, 
actively constructed, and questionable. Characteristics of successful students represent that 
learning is either innate or takes time and effort. This factor includes items from orderly process 
and quick learning and innate learning. Attainability of truth indicates an objective truth that can 
be known or a rejection of the notions of objective truth—which was also found in Hofer’s (2000) 
questionnaire. They also conducted t-test to gauge the differences in epistemic beliefs between 
males and females. The results indicated that there are some differences between the genders in 
undergraduate students; however, male and female graduate students did not differ on any of the 
five factors.  
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Comparison across different questionnaires. 
As reviewed earlier, there are several questionnaires for multidimensional measurement 
of personal epistemology; therefore, the next question would be how to select an instrument and 
whether or not a better instrument exists. As a result, several scholars conducted comparison 
studies in order to determine a more reliable and valid questionnaire.  
First, Schraw et al. (2002) compared their EBI with Schommer’s EQ. One hundred sixty 
undergraduates participated in the study and completed both the EQ and the EBI. They 
conducted different extraction and rotation methods, and found that different combinations 
resulted in similar factor structures. Five factors were reported for EQ, including integrative 
thinking, incremental learning, certain knowledge 1, certain knowledge 2, and innate ability. 
Certain knowledge 1 represents accessibility to certain knowledge, e.g., “Scientists will 
ultimately discover truths.” Certain knowledge 2 represents the degree to which certain 
knowledge exists. Integrative thinking, the new factor, represents that thinking is integrative and 
original.  
The EBI resulted in five different factors, comprising omniscient authority, certain 
knowledge, quick learning, simple knowledge, and innate ability, which had been commonly 
extracted in other studies. Schraw et al. (2002) found that the EBI explained more sample 
variations than EQ. None of the EQ factors was significantly correlated with reading 
comprehension scores, but EBI factors were significantly correlated with the scores. The finding 
suggested that the construct validity of EQ was troublesome. However, both questionnaires had 
low internal consistency, as confirmed by Debacker et al. (2008). Interestingly, these two 
questionnaires did not seem to measure personal epistemology in the same fashion, although the 
labels were similar. Correlation coefficients of the nine factors extracted by the two instruments 
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were low, except for certain knowledge one in EQ versus certain knowledge in EBI and 
integrative thinking in EQ versus quick learning in EBI. The results indicated that EBI and EQ 
both tapped the same certain knowledge dimension. Integrative thinking was also negatively 
correlated to quick learning, which implies that quick learning may impede deeper learning. 
Another study done by Debacker et al. (2008) compared EQ, EBS, and EBI. These three 
instruments are all domain-general and based on the factor structure proposed by Schommer 
(1990). They first conducted a confirmatory factor analysis of EBI and EBS to evaluate whether 
these items fit the proposed factor structures. For EQ, in order to extract a reasonable factor 
structure, they conducted a principal axis factoring analysis of both subsets and items, and then 
conducted CFA.  
Debacker et al. (2008) found that their EBI data did not fit the theoretical model that 
Schraw et al. (1995) had proposed. Factors regarding beliefs about knowledge (i.e. simple 
knowledge, certain knowledge, and omniscient authority) had higher correlations with each 
other, and so did beliefs about learning (i.e. quick learning and innate ability). Compared with 
EBS, EBI had worse fit statistics and internal consistency, but less interrelatedness among 
factors. When excluding those items with low loadings (<.35) in EBI and EBS, both of the fit 
statistics improved. Additionally, they also failed to generate the same factor structure as 
Schommer’s (1990). They only found two meaningful factors, belief in simple knowledge and 
fixed ability, through analysis of 12 subsets. It is notable that they could not yield a similar 
structure when conducting a factor analysis of Schommer’s complete 63 items. The fit statistics 
for EQ were better than for EBS or EBI; however, the numbers were not comparable. The EQ 
factors in Debacker et al.’s (2008) study were different from the items and the structure proposed 
by Schommer, since Debacker et al. removed items through the factor analysis.  
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Debacker et al. (2008) recommended EBI and EBS over EQ, based on the following 
reasons. Regarding the use of EQ, sample-specific scoring and their failure of capturing the 
theoretical factor structure provided evidence of psychometric problems. A factor structure can 
be different for each new sample. As a result, each study actually uses a different structure to 
measure the same construct. Their concern also raises the problem of comparing findings across 
studies, even though studies use the same instrument.  
In general, the internal consistency for these three instruments was poor. The reliability 
for most factors was below .7. The more reliable factors they found were all related to learning 
or intelligence, including beliefs in fixed ability and speed of knowledge acquisition. EBS had 
better factors of the structure of knowledge and knowledge construction and modification, but 
the Cronbach alphas coefficients were still low. Debacker et al. (2008) suggested that a more 
domain- or context-specific instrument of epistemic beliefs might yield higher internal 
consistency.  
Summary. 
Schommer’s questionnaire is the most widely used epistemic beliefs instrument and has 
been adjusted for different contexts, including middle school students, high school students, and 
students in higher education. However, as aforementioned, there are diverse theoretical issues 
(Hofer & Pintrich, 1997) and problems about the construct and item validity and reliability 
(Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Debacker et al., 2008; Schraw et al., 1995). Although consistent factors 
have been identified in the research, there are variations with regard to the number of identified 
factors and the nature of the beliefs.  
Hofer and Pintrich (1997) extensively reviewed the construct of epistemic beliefs and 
criticized that factors of beliefs in intelligence, learning, and instruction should be removed from 
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instruments of epistemic beliefs. Extensive discussion is presented in is presented in the section 
on Schommer's multidimensional models. Although which theoretical model is more accurate is 
still an open issue for empirical investigation, Hofer’s questionnaire was preferable to other 
questionnaires (e.g. Schommer’s EQ, Jehng’s JEQ, or EBI) for the following reasons.  
First, separating beliefs about knowledge from beliefs about learning could provide 
clarification to the research and theorizing in the field. Focusing on beliefs in knowledge and 
knowing might particularly be more beneficial for understanding online sharing behaviors. 
Bråten and Strømsø (2006) found beliefs about knowledge and knowing were explanatory 
variables for online communication preference, but did not find the same relationship between 
beliefs about learning and that preference. Their findings are further discussed in the next 
section. Since the relationships between epistemic beliefs and individuals’ contributions to online 
communities were of interest, beliefs about knowledge and knowing were the focus of this 
current research.  
In addition, since participants in this study were adults participating in online 
communities of practice, Hofer’s DEBQ was more suitable for the context of this current 
research. Schommer-Aikins (2002) pointed out that children were less able to differentiate 
beliefs about knowledge from beliefs about learning. Adults might be more capable of 
differentiating the two beliefs than children.  
Second, a domain-specific questionnaire was preferable. Many of the current instruments 
were domain-general in nature, such as Shommer’s EQ and Jehng’s JEQ. DeBacker et al. (2008) 
found that the domain-general questionnaires had a more serious problem with internal 
consistency. They suggested that a more context-specific questionnaire, like Hofer’s DEBQ, 
might yield higher internal consistency. In addition, Shommer-Aikins (2002) highlighted that 
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domain-specific epistemic beliefs would become more and more important as an individual 
develops. Children’s epistemic beliefs tend to be domain-general. When an individual gains 
more experience in domains of interest, he begins to develop domain-specific epistemic beliefs, 
which may deviate from domain-general epistemic beliefs developed during his childhood 
(Schommer-Aikins, Duell, & Barker, 2003). For participants in this current research, adults in 
online communities of practice, domain-focused epistemic beliefs were conceivably more 
important than domain-general beliefs. Consequently, it made sense to distribute a domain-
focused questionnaire. 
Third, considering the data collection process of this study, it was more appropriate to 
adopt a short questionnaire. Typically, the measurements of epistemic beliefs have had a large 
number of items (e.g., 64 items in Schommer’s EQ and 51 items in Jehng et al.’s JEQ). A long 
questionnaire might easily exhaust respondents and reduce their willingness to complete the 
entire questionnaire. While this might not be a problem in a setting where survey completion is 
required (e.g. a school or university class), it was considered a potential threat in this context, as 
survey participation was voluntary and completion of all questions could not be mandated. 
Finally, compared with other questionnaires, Hofer’s questionnaire was easier to adapt to 
design-focused epistemic beliefs. Items regarding beliefs in learning and instruction from other 
models were mainly focused on school settings, such as “Students who are mediocre in high 
school will remain mediocre in college’ (Jehng, 1991). These items were harder to modify to 
design-focused items. For these four reasons, Hofer’s DEBQ was selected. 
In summary, the multidimensional models and associated instruments attracted a great 
deal of attention. Researchers in the field extensively explored the relationship between 
epistemic beliefs and variables other than age and gender. Previous studies have explored the 
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effects of epistemic beliefs on learning performance (Schommer et al., 1992; Schommer, 1993) 
as well as learning strategy (Schommer et al., 1992; Schommer-Aikins et al., 2005), reasoning 
(Schommer, 1990), and ill-structured problem solving (Schraw et al., 1995). However, validity 
of these studies is limited by audience. Furthermore, differences of epistemic beliefs in different 
disciplines were confirmed in various studies, both within an individual (Hofer, 2000) and 
among individuals in different domains (Jehng et al., 1993). As suggested in Buehl (2008), 
researchers should continue to explore how beliefs about knowledge emerge and how beliefs are 
related to formal and informal education experiences. Table 3 presents a summary of 
multidimensional measurements and findings which are based on a review framework by Buehl 
(2008). 
 
  
Table 3 
Summary of Multidimensional Measurements 
Author(s), Year 
n/Ed. Level 
Based Instrument:  
Details and Format Analysis 
Extracted Factors 
(Cronbach alphas) Relationships with other variables 
Schommer, 1990 
263/Ungrd 
Origin of epistemological 
questionnaire (EQ) 
 63 items, 12 subsets 
 5-point scale 
 15-20 mins to administer 
Five hypothesized factors 
 Simple knowledge 
 Certain knowledge 
 Omniscient authority 
 Innate ability 
 Quick learning 
 
EFA 
 Principal factor analysis of 12 subsets 
 Varimax rotation  
 Extraction- λ(Eigenvalue) > 1 
 Item selection- loadings > .5 
 55.2 percent of variance explained 
 Simple knowledge  
 Certain knowledge 
 Innate ability  
 Quick learning 
 Home and educational background affect 
epistemic beliefs. 
 Quick learning explains oversimplified 
conclusions, poor performance, and 
overconfidence in test.  
 Certain knowledge explains 
inappropriately absolute conclusions. 
Schommer, 
Crouse, & 
Rhodes 1992 
424/Ungrd 
EQ 
 63 items 
 5-point scale 
 15-20 mins to administer 
 5 assumed factors 
EFA 
 Principal factor analysis of 12 subsets 
 Varimax rotation  
 Extraction- λ > 1 results in 3 factors and λ 
>.95 results in 4 factors. 
 Item selection- loadings N/A 
 54.2 percent of variance explained 
CFA 
 Compared the 4-factor structure from 
Schommer (1990) to 3-factor structure 
from this study 
 3 factors: GFI=.911; AGFI=.864 
 4 factors: GFI=.938; AGFI=.899 
 
 The 4-factor structure from 
this data was different from 
the 4-factor structure from 
Schommer (1990).  
 CFA suggested that 4-factor 
model from Schommer 
(1990) provided the best fit of 
the data 
 Belief in simple knowledge explains 
learning performance and comprehension 
in a math passage.  
 Study strategies mediate belief in simple 
knowledge and performance. 
Schommer, 1993 
1182/Secondary 
Students 
EQ 
 Minor changes of 
Schommer (1990) 
 Number of items: N/A 
 5-point scale 
 15-20 mins to administer 
EFA 
 Principal factor analysis of 12 subsets 
 Varimax rotation  
 Extraction- λ > .98 
 Item selection- loadings >.5 
 53.5 percent of variance explained 
 Fixed ability 
 Simple knowledge 
 Quick learning 
 Certain knowledge 
(Cronbach alphas ranges from 
.51 to .78.) 
 Differences in epistemic beliefs between 
genders and grades were found. 
 Belief in simple knowledge, certain 
knowledge, and quick learning decreased 
across the school years. 
 Fewer girls believed in quick learning and 
fixed ability. 
 Less belief in quick learning explains 
higher GPA. 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Author(s), Year 
n/Ed. Level 
Based Instrument:  
Details and Format Analysis 
Extracted Factors 
(Cronbach alphas) Relationships with other variables 
Schommer-
Aikins, 
Brookhart, & 
Hutter, 2000 
1269/ Middle 
school students 
EQ 
 Modified to have fewer 
items and simpler 
expression 
 30 items 
 5-point scale 
 15-20 mins to administer 
Four hypothesized factors 
 Ability to learn 
 Speed of learning 
 Stability of knowledge 
 Structure of knowledge 
 
CFA 
 Factor analysis of 30 items 
 4 factors: GFI=.87; CFI=.67; χ2/df = 2.91; 
RMR=.088 
 3 factors: GFI=.982; CFI=.978; χ2/df = 
1.61; RMR=.038 
 The four hypothesized factors 
did not result in a good fit, so 
they deleted items with small 
factor loadings and without 
correlation with other items 
 The new model resulted in 
three factors: stability of 
knowledge, speed of learning, 
and ability to learning 
 Students who believed in more gradual 
learning and incremental ability had higher 
GPA. 
 No significant difference was found 
between genders. 
Schommer-
Aikins, Duell, & 
Hutter, 2005 
1269/ Middle 
school students 
EQ 
 30 items from their study 
in 2000. 
 5-point scale 
 15-20 mins to administer 
EFA 
 Three steps of analysis: 
1. Conduct factor analysis of 30 items. Use 
varimax rotation and scree plot to decide 
number of factors that they are going to 
extract. 
2. Conduct factor analysis of 30 items to 
extract 4 factors. 
3. Conduct factor analysis of 21 items that 
had high loadings in step two (Loadings 
> .3). 
 40.35 percent of variance explained 
 
 Quick learning (.77) 
 Studying aimlessly (.55) 
 Omniscient authority (.55) 
 Certain knowledge (.36) 
 Beliefs in quick learning and studying 
aimlessly were related to beliefs about 
math and math confidence. 
 Both general and domain-specific 
epistemic beliefs explain students’ GPA. 
Jehng, Johnson, 
& Anderson, 
1993 
385/ Ungrad & 
Grad 
Origin of Jehng et al.’s 
Epistemological Questionnaire 
(JEQ) 
 60 items for the pretest 
 51 items for the final 
version 
 7-point scale 
Five hypothesized factors 
 Certainty of knowledge 
 Omniscient authority 
 Orderly process 
 Innate ability 
 Quick learning 
Eliminate items through Cronbach α (<.1) and 
low discrimination power. 
CFA 
 34 items were left for the later analysis.  
 LISREL 
 Test 5-factor model for 34 items 
 χ2 (517)=571.44 
 GFI=.929 
 The same five factors 
 (.42-.59) 
 Scores on each dimension were computed 
by the average rating for all of the items 
loading on the particular factor. 
MANOVA 
 Comparing with undergraduates and 
students in business as well as engineering, 
graduate students and social science and 
art students were more likely to believe 
that knowledge is uncertain, knowledge is 
best acquired from independent reasoning, 
and learning is not an orderly process. 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Author(s), Year 
n/Ed. Level 
Based Instrument:  
Details and Format Analysis 
Extracted Factors 
(Cronbach alphas) Relationships with other variables 
Schraw, Dunkle, 
& Bendixen, 
1995 
I: 212/ Ungrad 
II: 124/ Ungrad 
Origin of Schraw et al.’s 
Epistemic Belief Inventory 
(EBI) 
 32 items (26 items were 
new, and 6 items were 
reworded from items 
developed by Schommer 
(1990).  
 5-point scale 
Five hypothesized factors 
 Simple knowledge 
 Certain knowledge 
 Omniscient authority 
 Fixed ability 
 Quick learning 
 
EFA 
 Principal factor analysis of 32 items 
 Oblique rotation and varimax conducted, 
and varimax reported 
 Extraction- λ > 1 
 Item selection- loadings > .3 and cross-
loading <.3 
 16 items were left.  
 Study I: 64 percent of variance explained 
 Study II: 60 percent of variance explained 
 The same five-factor 
structure as hypothesized 
 Scores on each dimension were computed 
by the average rating for all of the items 
loading on the particular factor. 
Regression 
 Quick learning was a significant 
explanatory variable of well-defined 
problem solving.  
Discriminant Analyses 
 Determine which factors of epistemic 
beliefs discriminated four levels of 
relativism. 
 Epistemic beliefs were related to 
performance on the ill-defined tasks but 
not well-defined tasks. 
Wood & 
Kardash, 2002 
793/Ungrad & 
Grad 
Combine EQ and JEQ 
 80 items (58 items from 
EQ and 22 items from 
JEQ) 
 5-point scale 
Eliminate items through inter-item correlation 
<.1. Sixty-four items were left.  
EFA 
 Principle axis factor of items 
 Promax rotation 
 Extraction- λ > 1 and scree plot 
 22.05 percent of variance explained 
 Item selection- loadings > .35 and cross-
loading <.25 
 38 items were left for later analysis 
 
 Speed of knowledge 
acquisition (.74) 
 Structure of knowledge (.72) 
 Knowledge construction and 
modification (.66) 
 Characteristics of successful 
students (.58) 
 Attainability of objective 
truth (.54) 
 Scores on each dimension were computed 
by the average rating for all of the items 
loading on the particular factor. 
T-test 
 There are some differences between 
genders for undergraduate students. 
 However, male and female graduate 
students did not differ on all five factors. 
Hofer, 2000 
326/Ungrad 
Origin of Hofer’s DEBQ 
 27 items 
 5-point scale  
 Administrated separately 
for knowledge in 
psychology and in 
science. 
Four hypothesized factors: 
 Certainty of Knowledge 
 Simplicity of Knowledge 
 Source of Knowledge 
 Justification for Knowing 
 
EFA 
 Principle component analysis and 
maximum likelihood factoring of items 
 Varimax rotation 
 Extraction- λ > 1 and scree plot 
 Item selection- loadings > .4 (except one 
item=.32) 
 18 items were left.  
 Psychology: 46.09 percent of variance 
explained 
 Science: 53.14 percent of variance 
explained 
 Certain/ simple knowledge 
(.74 in psychology/.81 in 
science) 
 Justification for knowing: 
personal (.56/.61) 
 Source of knowledge: 
authority (.51/.64) 
 Attainability of truth (.60/.75) 
Strong disciplinary differences were found 
within an individual. 
 Compared with knowledge in psychology, 
knowledge in science is more certain and 
unchanging. 
 For science, students were more likely to 
regard authority and experts as the source 
of knowledge, more likely to believe truth 
is attainable by experts, and less likely to 
regard personal knowledge and firsthand 
experience as a basis for justification. 
    (continued)
54 
  
Table 3 (continued) 
Author(s), Year 
n/Ed. Level 
Based Instrument:  
Details and Format Analysis 
Extracted Factors 
(Cronbach alphas) Relationships with other variables 
Schraw, 
Bendixen, & 
Dunkle, 2002 
160/Ungrd 
EBI & EQ 
 28 items from EBI and 63 
items from EQ 
 Administer EQ first and 
then EBI 
EFA 
 Principal factor analysis of items 
 Conduct oblique rotation and varimax 
rotation 
 Varimax rotation was reported.  
EQ 
 35 percent of variance explained 
 Item selection- loadings > .3 
EBI 
 60 percent of variance explained 
 Item selection- loadings > .3 
 None cross-loadings >.3 
 
EQ 
 Integrative thinking (.61) 
 Incremental learning (.64) 
 Certain knowledge-1 (.74) 
 Certain knowledge-2 (.53) 
 Innate ability (.74) 
EBI 
 Omniscient authority (.68) 
 Certain knowledge (.62) 
 Quick learning (.58) 
 Simple knowledge (.62) 
 Innate ability (.62) 
 EBI explained more sample variation than 
EQ.  
 Internal consistency coefficients are all 
low. 
 In general, EQ factors were uncorrelated 
with EBI factors, except certain knowledge 
versus certain knowledge 1 and quick 
learning versus integrative thinking.  
 EBI had stronger correlations to reading 
comprehension than EQ. 
DeBacker, 
Crowson, 
Beesley, Thoma, 
&Hestevold, 
2008 
I: 795/Ungrd 
II: 795/ Ungrd 
II: 935/ Ungrd 
EQ, EBI, and EBS 
I: EBI 
 Five hypothesized factors: 
Simple knowledge, certain 
knowledge, quick 
learning, fixed learning, 
and omniscient authorities 
II: EBS 
 Received a packet of 
surveys and completed at 
home 
 Five hypothesized factors: 
speed of knowledge 
acquisition, structure of 
knowledge, knowledge 
construction and 
modification, 
characteristics of 
successful students, and 
attainability of objective 
truth. 
III:EQ 
 Received a packet of 
surveys and completed at 
home 
I: CFA using LISREL 
 Sample 1: CFI=.79, GFI=.85, AGFI=.8 
 Sample 2: CFI=.83, GFI=.85, AGFI=.83 
 Exclude the 11 items, Sample 1: CFI=.89, 
GFI=.91, AGFI=.88, RMSEA=.06 
 Exclude the 11 items, Sample 2: CFI=.91, 
GFI=.91, AGFI=.89, RMSEA=.053 
II: CFA using LISREL 
 Sample 1: CFI=.9, GFI=.85, AGFI=.83, 
RMSEA=.05 
 Sample 2: CFI=.88, GFI=.85, AGFI=.83, 
RMSEA=.052 
 Exclude the 9 items, Sample 1: CFI=.92, 
GFI=.88, AGFI=.86, RMSEA=.052 
 Exclude the 9 items, Sample 2: CFI=.89, 
GFI=.87, AGFI=.85, RMSEA=.059 
III 
1. EFA of subsets 
 Principal axis factoring with varimax 
rotation 
 Extraction- λ > 1 
 Item selection- loadings > .35  
 Six subsets loaded on two factors  
 26.74 percent of variance explained 
2. EFA of 63 items 
 Did not result in a meaningful structure 
3. CFA of the 2-factor structure created in step 4. 
CFI=.97, GFI=.99, AGFI=.97, RMSEA=.045 
 
III: EFA of subsets 
 Belief in simple 
knowledge: avoid 
ambiguity, seek single 
answers, and avoid 
integration 
 Belief in fixed ability: 
cannot learn how to learn, 
learn the first time, and 
success unrelated to hard 
work 
They failed to generate the same factor 
structure as Schommer’s (1990). 
Fit statistics: EQ>EBS>EBI 
Internal consistency: EBS>EBI>EQ (They 
were all low.) 
Interrelatedness: EBS>EBI 
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Domain Specificity and Epistemic Beliefs 
The reviews of previous models lead to the discussion of domain specificity. Whether 
epistemic beliefs are different across domains and disciplines is explored. The construct is better 
understood through domain-general, domain-focused, or domain-specific models.  
There has been a trend in the study of epistemic beliefs to shift from a domain-general 
(Baxter Magolda, 1992; King & Kitchener, 1994; Perry, 1970) to a domain-specific assumption. 
Meanings of domains are usually interchangeable throughout academic disciplines (Hofer & 
Pintrich, 1997). Alexander (1992) characterized a domain as a particular field of study, 
comprising declarative, procedural, and conditional knowing. Hofer (2006) indicated that 
domains should also include knowledge beyond the academic realm.  
Several studies concluded differences of epistemic belief in various domains and 
disciplines, but one study identified the characteristics of domain generality. Schommer and her 
colleagues found domain-general beliefs between math and social science (Schommer & Walker, 
1995). On the contrary, a series of later studies done by Schommer and her colleagues concluded 
the existence of both domain generality and specificity in math, social sciences, and business 
(Schommer-Aikins, Duell, & Barker, 2003; Schommer-Aikins et al., 2005). Juhng et al. (1993) 
also found differences between social science/art (soft fields) and business/engineering (hard 
fields). Buehl and her colleagues found both domain-general and domain-specific epistemic 
beliefs in history (ill-structured domains) and mathematics (well-structured domains) (Buehl, 
Alexander, Murphy, 2002). Her later research also indicated a consistency in the sophistication 
of epistemic beliefs across the two domains (Buehl, et al., 2004). Hofer (2000) found that an 
individual could hold different epistemic beliefs in psychology and science. Epistemic beliefs 
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within individuals could be activated in a given context but not in another context; the beliefs 
might be context-sensitive in one context but remain stable in another context.  
A combination model that was both domain-general and domain-specific in nature was 
proposed by several researchers (Buehl & Alexander, 2001; Muis et al., 2006). Buehl and 
Alexander introduced a nested model with three levels of belief: general epistemic beliefs at a 
broad layer, domain-specific beliefs (e.g., beliefs about psychology knowledge), and general 
beliefs about academic knowledge. This model was extended by Muis et al. (2006) and 
emphasized the development of epistemic beliefs over time in a socio-cultural context.  
In terms of the development of instruments and items, Hofer (2005) identified three 
different types of instruments in the field: (a) domain-general questionnaires (e.g., EQ, JEQ, 
etc.), (b) domain-focused questionnaires (e.g., Buehl et al., 2002; Hofer, 2000), and (c) domain-
specific questionnaires (e.g., Elder, 2002). The second type has similar statements to domain-
general questionnaires, but respondents are required to refer to the domain (e.g., psychology) 
while answering the questions. Items in the third type of questionnaire specifically pinpoint a 
domain and include particular ways of knowing the domain, such as an experimental method for 
knowing science.  
 
Epistemic Beliefs and Participation in Online Activities and Online Communities 
As discussed earlier, personal epistemology involves understanding personal beliefs 
about the nature of knowledge and knowing. The construct plays an even more important role 
when learning takes place within an online environment. Learners within an online learning 
environment require a self-regulated and self-directed process. Online learners, especially adults, 
have the power to decide who can instruct them, why they need to learn, what they want to learn, 
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where they should stay while learning, when they should learn, and how to learn effectively and 
efficiently. Characteristics of online information are also different from traditional sources of 
information. Information on the Web is enormous in volume and updates rapidly. Knowing how 
to filter useful and relatively accurate information becomes an important skill. These issues and 
the resulting decisions are all conceivably affected by an individual’s beliefs about knowledge 
and knowing. 
There are two diverse perspectives based on empirical studies of the relationship between 
epistemic beliefs and designs and effectiveness of online learning environments. First, studies of 
interest believe epistemic beliefs are related to the characteristics of an individual, and they 
explore how these beliefs influence the individual’s online learning performance and behaviors. 
The purpose of these studies is to improve the designs of the online environments and enhance 
the individual’s performance. Since this perspective is the focus of this dissertation, the 
following review presents related discussions, including that of online learning performance, 
designs of online learning environments, designs of online help environments, online searching 
and seeking information, and communication through an online system in relation to individuals’ 
epistemic beliefs. Another perspective concerns how the design of online learning environments 
can improve individuals’ development of epistemic beliefs. In other words, such studies use 
epistemic beliefs as dependent variables (e.g., Tsai, 2008). Since this is not the purpose of this 
current research, the following reviews accordingly exclude them.  
Online learning performance. 
When scholars in the field started observing epistemic beliefs in a new context, the 
question that they asked first concerned the impact of epistemic beliefs on an individual’s online 
learning performance. Bendixen and Hartley (2003) found that beliefs in omniscient authority 
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and fixed ability were negatively related to learning achievement within online learning 
environments, which was consistent with the paper-based study from Schommer (1990). 
However, contrary to Schommer’s (1990) findings, belief in quick learning was positively 
related to achievement. Bendixen and Hartley postulated that this was due to time limitations. 
Those participants only had 30 minutes to study a Geography instruction manual, so the belief 
actually facilitated those students to read through the material in a timely way. 
With respect to ill-structured problem solving performance within online discussion 
environments, Oh and Jonassen (2007) provided a case scenario (e.g. a student with some 
problematic behaviors in school) in their research, and asked participants to analyze the case and 
to find an appropriate solution. They used EBI (Schraw et al., 1995) to understand individuals’ 
epistemic beliefs. As expected, they found that belief in simple knowledge was negatively 
correlated with individual problem-solving performance. Individuals with a greater belief in 
simple knowledge were less likely to explore solution alternatives. However, contrary to 
previous studies (Bendixen & Hartley, 2003; Schommer, 1990), Oh and Jonassen found positive 
correlations among ill-structured problem-solving performance, belief in omniscient authority, 
and belief in fixed learning. However, they did not provide an explanation for this unexpected 
relationship.  
Epistemic beliefs and designs of learning environments. 
Regarding the designs of online environments, Jacobson and Spiro (1995) tested the 
effects of two different ways of structuring learning content: hypertext-like and linear-like online 
environments. Among individuals who had advanced epistemic beliefs, problem-solving essay 
scores were significantly higher in a more hypertext-like environment than in a simple, linear-
like environment. Students with simple epistemic beliefs instead gained higher problem-solving 
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essay scores in a linear-like learning environment. Jacobson and Spiro concluded that students 
with simple epistemic beliefs might have difficulty with the nonlinear nature of the hypertext 
system. 
Windschitl and Andre (1998) examined two other types of design: constructivist versus 
objectivist computer simulation environments. The constructivist design allowed students to play 
with the simulation to hypothesize about and test possible answers to 12 questions about the 
human cardiovascular system; the objectivist design included step-by-step cookbook instructions 
prescribed by the researchers that led to answers to the human cardiovascular system questions. 
They used Schommer’s 63-item questionnaire and calculated the overall scores as an index of 
participants’ personal epistemic beliefs. Individuals with more sophisticated epistemic beliefs 
received higher learning scores within the constructivist simulation environment; individuals 
with less advanced beliefs learned more within the objectivist environment.  
Demetriadis et al. (2008) conducted an experiment to test the interaction between 
individuals’ epistemic beliefs and a scaffolding design within a web-based learning environment 
to examine the effect of two factors on students’ learning performance. The group with the 
scaffolding design received three extra questions that could guide students to think through 
problems. Their findings indicated that those with complex epistemic beliefs in the scaffolded 
group acquired higher scores on the conceptual knowledge test than those with simple epistemic 
beliefs. The individuals with more complex epistemic beliefs were more responsive to the 
scaffolding design and benefited more. 
Epistemic beliefs and designs of online help environments. 
As Aleven et al. (2003) has indicated, individuals usually do not use help systems 
effectively; help systems are either underused or overused. Epistemic beliefs are one of the major 
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factors that may influence an individual’s use of a help system. They suggested that it is 
important to consider users’ epistemic beliefs and characteristics of subject matter content when 
designing a system. Thus, users may more easily understand logic and features of the help 
system, and as a result use it more effectively. Instead of understanding epistemic beliefs as a 
developmental model, they identified the beliefs as an individual difference. The design of 
different types of help for different epistemic beliefs of individuals was proposed. Additionally, 
existing studies (Baxter Magolda, 1992; Kuhn, 2000; Wood & Kardash, 2002) found that gender, 
age, and education were not sufficient to explain the variability in epistemic beliefs. Aleven et al. 
(2003) also emphasized that expertise is more important than age and year in school with regards 
to the seeking of further resources. Less able individuals may tend to use help more often. 
Bartholome, Stahl, Pieschol, and Bromme (2006) explored the efficiency of two types of 
help designs (context-sensitive help and glossary), and their interaction with personal epistemic 
beliefs. Context-sensitive help provides different help materials based on the context. They 
measured epistemic beliefs on a domain-specific level using 14 semantic differential scale items 
and extracted three factors: texture of knowledge (unstructured versus structured knowledge), 
variability of knowledge (static versus dynamic knowledge), and genesis of knowledge (detected 
versus constructed knowledge). Their findings indicated that individuals who believed that 
knowledge is unstructured used context-sensitive help more often than those who believed in 
certain and structured knowledge. Beliefs in the genesis of knowledge significantly impacted 
their task performance. In other words, those who believed that knowledge is created by self-
construction and negotiation went down fewer misleading paths and made more correct 
decisions. Bartholome, Stahl, Pieschol, and Bromme (2006) concluded that individuals with 
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sophisticated beliefs might monitor their tasks closely and were more likely to notice 
contradictory information on a wrong path earlier. 
Epietemic beliefs and online searching and seeking information. 
Regarding the relationship between online searching and judgment of information, Hofer 
(2004) stated, “Students’ use of the Internet as a medium for learning involves a host of 
epistemological judgments that deserve more attention” (p. 51). Hofer (2004) found that all four 
dimensions proposed by herself and Pintrich (1997) were mentioned in students’ think-aloud 
protocols and retrospective interviews. As expected, students with less sophisticated epistemic 
beliefs were more likely to pursue the searching task in a brief and intuitive way, and they did 
not perceive a need for examining the credibility and accuracy of sources.  
Mason and Boldrin (2008) also studied epistemic monitoring and judgment during online 
searching with three different groups of students: undergraduate, high school, and middle school. 
They found that spontaneous evaluation of the credibility of electronic resources exists at all 
grade levels, but that younger students were less likely to consider the authority of a source. 
In order to examine the influence of an individual’s beliefs about knowledge gained from 
Internet content and knowing while using the Internet, Bråten, Strømsø, and Samuelstuen (2005) 
developed a measure of Internet-specific epistemic beliefs. These were based on Hofer and 
Pintrich’s (1997) theoretical model and included 36 items on a five-point Likert scale. Two 
factors, general Internet epistemology and justification for knowing, were found. High scores on 
general Internet epistemology represented the certainty and simplicity of Internet-based 
knowledge; high scores on justification for knowing represented that Internet-based knowledge 
could be accepted without critical evaluation. Compared with Internet self-efficacy beliefs, they 
reported that Internet-specific epistemic beliefs more consistently predicted self-report Internet-
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search behavior. The self-reported Internet-search behavior included two perspectives: 
identification of relevant information and evaluation of the appropriateness of information. A 
sample item of identification of relevant information was “When I do my course work, I use web 
sites that are relevant to the topics I study” (p. 167); a sample item of evaluation of the 
appropriateness of information was “I have difficulty identifying important information when I 
use the Internet” (p. 166). 
In 2006, they re-examined the relationship between self-reported Internet-search 
activities and domain-general epistemic beliefs using items adapted from the Schommer’s EQ 
(Bråten & Strømsø, 2006). They only tested two domain-general dimensions: beliefs about the 
speed of knowledge acquisition, and beliefs about knowledge construction and modification. 
Their findings indicated that only beliefs about the speed of knowledge acquisition had a 
correlation with the self-report Internet-search behavior. Students with beliefs of quick learning 
might not realize the great challenge involved in an information search, so they were more likely 
to report that they could proficiently perform search tasks on the Internet.  
Whitmire (2003) explored the connection between epistemic beliefs and information-
seeking behavior. Information-seeking behavior is characterized in six stages: task initiation 
(recognize a need for information), topic selection (identify and select the general topic to be 
investigated or the approach to be pursued), pre-focus exploration (investigate information on the 
general topic to extend personal understanding), focus formulation (form a focus from the 
information encountered), collection (gather information related to the focused topic), and 
presentation (complete the search and prepare to present or use the findings). Students’ levels of 
epistemic beliefs were assessed through interviews. A low level represented Perry’s Dualism; a 
medium level represented multiplicity; and a high level represented relativism and commitment 
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within relativism. At the topic selection stage, individuals with medium-low epistemic beliefs 
were less engaged in the process and more likely to allow their advisor to select a topic for them. 
On the contrary, medium-high or high epistemic believers tended to consult different people and  
refer to various resources during the topic selection and pre-focus exploration stages. They were 
more likely to use a variety of search techniques and perceived themselves as capable of 
evaluating information. These students with medium-high or high beliefs actively assessed the 
information that they gathered and rejected conflicting information, based on their knowledge 
and their recognition of authoritative sources as well as political biases in the field.  
Epistemic beliefs and communication through an online system. 
Bråten and his colleagues (2005) explored the relationship between Internet-specific 
epistemic beliefs and self-reported Internet communication preferences. Guidance, cooperation, 
and discussion activities and preference for Internet-based feedback and discussion were rated in 
the category of Internet communication preferences. For instance, “I would rather get feedback 
on my work face-to-face than on the Internet” (Bråten et al., 2005, p. 166). Compared with 
Internet self-efficacy beliefs, Internet-specific epistemic beliefs were a better explanatory 
variable for self-report Internet communication preferences.  
In 2006, they re-examined Internet communication preferences and epistemic beliefs 
using items adapted from the Schommer’s domain-general EQ (Bråten & Strømsø, 2006). They 
concluded that beliefs about knowledge construction and modification were a significant factor 
in Internet communication preferences. The dimension of knowledge construction and 
modification ranged from the belief that knowledge is given and stable to the belief that 
knowledge is actively constructed and consistently evolving, which is related to certainty and 
source of knowledge. The students with less sophisticated beliefs in knowledge construction and 
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modification were less likely to report using the Internet for study-related communication 
purposes. 
Hornik, Johnson, and Wu (2007) conducted a study to explore how an individual’s 
communication, satisfaction, and engagement are influenced by the congruency or discrepancy 
of epistemic beliefs and technological support in online learning environments. Research 
participants were given definitions of three types of learning models: objectivist, constructivist, 
and collaborative models. They were required to respond to two questions using the three 
learning models: (a) what learning approach would be the most effective way for them to learn, 
(b) what learning approach did they feel the currently used course management system 
supported. If they answered the two questions differently, it was deemed that a discrepancy 
existed. Communication was defined by the number of read discussion posts, the number of 
original discussion posts, and the number of follow-up discussion posts. Findings supported the 
idea that when discrepancy exists between an individual’s epistemic beliefs and perceptions of 
how the technology supports learning, that person’s learning performance, satisfaction, and 
course communication were reduced. In other words, matching epistemic beliefs and the 
technical support of learning environments can enhance learning performance and course 
communication. However, there is a need to be cautious about generalizing and applying 
findings from Hornik et al. (2007), since they measured epistemic beliefs differently from those 
studies based on Schommer’s EQ. Epistemic beliefs in their study were assessed based on 
students’ responses to the question about the most effective way to learn. They defined epistemic 
beliefs as “learner perceptions about what is the most effective way of learning” (p. 27). 
Although their findings are intriguing, the implications for epistemic beliefs are limited.  
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Summary. 
Previous research has indicated negative correlations between problem-solving 
performance, quick learning (Bendixen & Hartley, 2003), and simple knowledge (Oh & 
Jonassen, 2007). However, there is no consistent finding on omniscient authority and fixed 
learning (Bendixen & Hartley, 2003; Oh & Jonassen, 2007). In order to design an effective 
online learning environment, several scholars suggested it is necessary to design an environment 
based on users’ epistemic beliefs. If the design is congruent with individuals’ epistemic beliefs 
inherent in the subject matter, they may perform better, engage more, and learn more.  
Regarding online searching and information-seeking behaviors, Schommer (1998) 
posited that individuals with stronger beliefs in simple and certain knowledge are likely to search 
for single answers. In contrast, those who believe in complex and tentative knowledge may 
search for complex answers and anticipate multiple solutions. They are also prone to flexible and 
thorough thinking. Hofer (2004) found that all four theorized factors (certainty, simplicity, 
source of knowledge, and justification for knowing) of epistemic beliefs were mentioned by her 
research participants while they thought aloud during their online search process. The beliefs 
influence how an individual pursues searching tasks and how an individual justifies the collected 
information. More sophisticated epistemic believers were more likely to consider different 
information sources, consult different people, and actively evaluate the information (Whitmire, 
2003). 
Concerning communication through an online system, there is a lack of research that 
addresses this topic. Bråten and Strømsø (2006) found that those who believed knowledge is 
constructed through the identification of new ideas and that the integration of information should 
be derived from multiple sources were more likely to report that they had used information 
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technology to discuss or communicate with others. This finding is important; however, the 
implication is limited, due to the self-report method they conducted. A question of interest is 
how to understand the influence of epistemic beliefs on individuals’ decisions and actual 
behaviors related to the contribution of knowledge. 
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Chapter 3 
Method 
The purpose of this study was to explore the relationships among levels of expertise, 
epistemic beliefs, and knowledge contributions to online CoPs hosted by firms. In this chapter, 
the contexts of the studied community, the population surveyed, and the procedures, 
implementation protocol, and analyses of the survey are described. 
 
Contexts of the Studied Community 
The online CoP was hosted by a software firm that developed diverse consumer and 
professional products. The firm had approximately US$3 billion in revenue and 7,000 employees 
worldwide in 2008. The studied online community included graphic designers and Web 
designers. In the community, various learning materials were provided by the firm in order to 
help users not only resolve technical problems but also improve their job skills by increasing 
their proficiency with the products. The materials included items such as featured articles from 
experts in the field of design, galleries showing selected experts’ artwork, video tutorials with 
step-by-step procedural instructions, and problem-solving and troubleshooting documents. Each 
type of resource had different characteristics and afforded different levels of participation for 
community members. For instance, the audio and video content in video tutorials provided easier 
procedural knowledge than text-based content. Additionally, while community members were 
only able to rate videos, they were able to have deeper level of participation for text-based 
content that allowed users to provide open-ended text,  such as sharing experiences about solving 
specific problems.   
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Documentation, a type of learning content provided by the firm, covered content for 
different levels of expertise. A table of contents was shown side by side with each content page. 
Technical writers employed by the firm created the documentation. At the bottom of each page, 
community members could comment on documentation pages. Figure 2 illustrates an example 
layout of a documentation page that users could see in a web browser. Users could share 
different types of information on the pages, e.g., questions about or mistakes within the article, 
their experience utilizing features, or tips they found. Users could access the documentation from 
the firm’s Website or from the help menu in the software. 
 
Figure 2. An example layout of an online documentation page. 
In order to maintain the quality of community content and motivate members’ 
participation, the firm adopted a moderation process. There were three roles in the community: 
administrator, moderator, and users. Administrators were responsible for recruiting moderators, 
setting policies, and playing a strategic role in managing the community. This role was filled by 
technical writers employed by the company. Moderators were content experts who were 
encouraged to contribute their expertise to the community by answering questions and sharing 
their experience. They were also authorized to remove unrelated posts and to assign community 
points to valuable comments. Users were community participants who used the software. They 
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were encouraged to post comments and share their expertise and experiences with the 
community. 
The moderation process starts with a user submitting a comment to the community on a 
documentation page. This comment then goes to a database that only moderators and 
administrators can access. When a moderator reviews the comment, he evaluates whether it is 
related to the content and whether it is valuable to other community users. If it is not related, the 
comment is redirected to other appropriate places. If it is a valuable comment, the moderator 
assigns points based on quality.  
The point system does not represent any monetary reward; it is a system of honor that 
implies users’ levels of experience with the software. This system was designed to increase 
users’ motivation to contribute to the community. There are five membership levels in the 
community through which users advance automatically after receiving a certain number of 
points. A user’s level is identified by an icon associated with the user’s ID on the personal profile 
page on the firm’s site. The profile page is publicly available with the individual’s photo, his 
brief bio, interests, community points, a membership icon, and other websites that he owns. 
When a user reaches the highest level, the firm would reward the user with a special badge. This 
badge could be placed on the user’s own website, to indicate the user’s extensive knowledge of 
the software.  
Moderators assigned points to each comment based on the point scheme developed by the 
firm. This detailed point scheme (Moderating comments, 2008, October 27) is presented in Table 
4. No points would be assigned to people seeking help or answers to questions, because such 
comments did not add additional value to the content. For those comments that identified 
mistakes or provided additional resources, different amounts of points were assigned. 
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Administrators held a two-hour training to communicate the moderation process and point 
scheme to moderators for the purpose of maintaining reliable and consistent moderation.  
Table 4 
Point Scheme for Comments 
Points Content of comments 
0 Point A relevant question or a request for clarification: Comments can be answered by a 
community member or a moderator. 
 
5 Points A typo or obvious correction: This is apparent to any user, regardless of skill. 
10 Points A minor correction or addition: This requires basic understanding of the product or 
technique described on a page. 
 
20 Points A more complex addition or tip: Comments require moderate to advanced 
understanding of the product. 
 
50 Points An advanced-level addition or tip (e.g., a detailed code example, a mini tutorial, or a 
multi-paragraph article). 
 
 
 
Participants 
Description of sampled population. 
Common characteristics of community members were that they all used the software to 
practice their jobs in design. Within the community, there were sub-communities that 
communicated in different languages, e.g., French or Japanese. Since the English community 
was relatively larger and more active than the other sub-communities, this research only focused 
on those who participated in English communities. Participation in this community was open to 
all users, not just those in English-speaking countries. However, a good knowledge of English 
would have been required to read the documents and participate. 
The research only studied users who posted at least one comment from November, 2008 
to March, 2009. Administrators and moderators were excluded from the study, due to a belief 
that they might have different motivation to participate in the community. One thousand and one 
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participants in total posted at least one comment in the English community during this period. 
Due to the size of the population, the research invitation was sent to the whole population.  
Description of participants. 
Research invitations were sent to all 1001 community members. Fourteen of them were 
undeliverable. Three hundred and fifteen members responded to the survey. The response rate 
was 32 percent. After review, 286 responses were regarded as usable for data analysis. The 
unusable responses included those that were partially blank with only limited questions 
answered.  
Participants’ actual contributions. 
 The distribution of quality and quantity of actual contributions was skewed. The quality 
of contributions ranged from 0 to 50; the mean score was 1.06 (standard deviation = 4.22). Of the 
285 respondents, only 15 percent of respondents had any points (see Table 5) and only 18 
percent of them posted more than once (see Table 6). Only 4.1 percent of the respondents 
provided more than five contributions.  
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Table 5 
Distribution of Quality of Contributions 
Points Frequency (Percent) 
0 244 (85.3) 
0.8 1 (0.3) 
1.5 1 (0.3%) 
1.7 2 (0.7%) 
1.8 1 (0.3%) 
2.0 1 (0.3%) 
2.5 7 (2.4%) 
2.7 2 (0.7%) 
4.2 1 (0.3%) 
5.0 16 (5.6%) 
6.7 1 (0.3%) 
7.5 1 (0.3%) 
10.0 2 (0.7%) 
20.0 4 (1.4%) 
22.5 1 (0.3%) 
50.0 1 (0.3%) 
Total 286 (100.0%) 
 
Table 6 
Distribution of Quantity of Contributions 
Number of contributions Frequency (Percent) 
1 206 (72.0%) 
2 48 (16.8%) 
3 14 (4.9%) 
4 4 (1.4%) 
 (continued)
 74 
 
Table 6 (continued)  
Number of contributions Frequency (Percent) 
5 6 (2.1%) 
6 3 (1.0%) 
7 1 (0.3%) 
11 1 (0.3%) 
13 1 (0.3%) 
31 1 (0.3%) 
33 1 (0.3%) 
Total 286 (100.0%) 
 
Participants’ gender and age.  
There were 208 (72.7 percent) male and 78 (27.3 percent) female respondents. The 
average age for the males was 43.02 and 44.24 for the females. The summary statistics are 
shown in Table 7. This present research had a similar respondent profile to a previous large-scale 
survey study done by the firm in 2008 (Abatecola, 2008). In that study, it also indicated the 
gender breakdown was about 70 percent male versus 30 percent female and the average age was 
42.  
Table 7 
Respondents’ Ages Across Gender 
Gender M SD Minimum Maximum 
Male 43.02 13.19 18 78 
Female 44.56 12.64 18 66 
Total 43.45 13.03 18 78 
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Participants’ levels of expertise.  
There were three questions regarding levels of expertise: Levels of experience with 
software, years of experience in their profession, and frequency of using the software. As seen in 
Table 8, all of the respondents had used the software, and only 9.8 percent of respondents were 
beginners. Most participants reported that they were intermediate, advanced, or expert users. 
More than one third of respondents (37.7 percent) had more than 9 years experience in the 
profession. Nearly half of them (50.9 percent) used the software daily; only 11.3 percent used the 
software either monthly or less than monthly. The majority of participants in this study were 
experienced and frequent users.  
Table 8 
Frequency and Means for Levels of Expertise 
Levels of expertise n (percent) 
Levels of experience with the software (N=286) 
 Beginner 28 (9.8) 
 Intermediate 90 (31.5) 
 Advanced 100 (35.0) 
 Expert 68 (23.8) 
  
Years of experience in the profession (N=284) 
 Less than 1 year 46 (16.2) 
 More than 1 year but less than 3 years 36 (12.7) 
 More than 3 years but less than 5 years 33 (11.6) 
 More than 5 years but less than 7 years 35 (12.3) 
 More than 7 years but less than 9 years 27 (9.5) 
 More than 9 years 107 (37.7) 
  
Frequency of using the software (N=285) 
 Less than once per month 13 (4.6) 
 Monthly 19 (6.7) 
 2 to 3 times per month 31 (10.9) 
 Weekly 77 (27.0) 
 Daily 
 
145 (50.9) 
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Instrument 
The questionnaire enclosed in Appendix A included three sections: levels of expertise, 
epistemic beliefs, and self-reported contributions to the community. They are further discussed in 
the following sections.  
Levels of expertise. 
Levels of expertise included levels of experience with the software (Never used, 
Beginner, Intermediate, Advanced, and Expert), years of experience in the profession (ranging 
from less than 1 year to more than 9 years), and frequency of using the software (Daily, Weekly, 
2 to 3 times per month, Monthly, and Less than once per month). The combination of these three 
questions provided respondents’ profiles of expertise, not only in using the software, but also in 
the design profession.  
The categories and descriptions of expertise were adapted from the categories proposed 
by Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986). According to the reviews in chapter 2, key characteristics for 
identifying expertise included extent of knowledge structure, ability to transfer learned skills to a 
new context, and problem-solving skills. The descriptions of each level were developed based on 
these three characteristics. Never used was described as, “I have never used the product.” 
Beginner was described as, “I know of a few features, only some of which I actually know how 
to use.” Beginners could use objective facts and apply them using over-simplified rules. 
However, they might not be able to apply the oversimplified rules in the new context. 
Intermediate was defined as, “I am familiar with enough features to get the job done but I still 
have a lot to learn.” In contrast to Beginners, intermediate users could apply learned facts and 
functionality of features to a new, real-world practice. Compared with advanced users, they had 
limited problem-solving skills. Advanced was defined as, “I confidently use and understand 
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many of the features and can troubleshoot common problems.” Expert was defined as “I am 
highly skilled in most (or all) of the features and can troubleshoot most of the problems I 
encounter.” The differences between advanced users and experts were their troubleshooting 
abilities and their knowledge of the software. 
Domain-focused epistemic beliefs. 
This study adopted the domain-focused epistemological beliefs questionnaire (DEBQ) 
developed by Hofer (2000). This questionnaire was developed based on a model proposed by 
Hofer and Pintrich (1997) with four assumed factors: certainty of knowledge, simplicity of 
knowledge, source of knowledge, and justification for knowing. This questionnaire included 27 
items with a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). They evaluated 
individual’s epistemic beliefs in two different knowledge domains, psychology and science. 
Certain/simple knowledge had eight items with Cronbach  equal to .74 in psychology and .81 in 
science; justification for knowing had four items with Cronbach  equal to .56 and .61; source of 
knowledge had four items with Cronbach  equal to .51 and .64; and attainability of truth had 
two items with Cronbach  equal to .60 and .71. For psychology, 46 percent of the variance was 
explained; for science, 53.14 percent of the variance was explained. 
Initial adaptation.  
Minor word changes were made from the DBEQ, due to the different population. For 
example, textbooks were changed to books; professors and scholars were changed to experts; 
researchers were changed to theorists; and answer was changed to design solution. In order to be 
more specific to the domain of design, all terms “in this field” and “in this subject” were replaced 
by “in the field of design” or “in design.” As a result of this modification, only two items did not 
have the term “design” included in the statement. 
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Pilot study.  
The purpose of the pilot study was to check the clarity of each item in the questionnaire 
of domain-focused epistemic beliefs and to test whether the language was understandable for 
design professionals. According to Gall, Gall, and Borg (2003) and Fowler (2002), the number of 
participants for a pilot study was often about two to three and always fewer than ten people. The 
pilot study from this research included three interviewees with different design backgrounds. 
One was a content writer for design professionals, another was a graphic designer, and the other 
was a Web designer. They were all advanced users of the software and had five years or more of 
work experience in design. The method allowed the questionnaire to encompass different 
perspectives in the field of design.  
The researcher interviewed three participants in person. Before the interviews, they were 
required to complete an online questionnaire and sign a consent letter. During the interview, the 
researcher first explained the purpose of the pilot study. Participants were provided an electronic 
feedback form, which included all items in the questionnaire. Then, they were given two options 
on each item, clear or unclear, and required to write reasons in a text box next to each item. 
They were encouraged to select unclear if they sensed other designers might have difficulties in 
understanding the questions. The researcher facilitated participants to answer reasons of why it 
was unclear by asking two questions: (a) What do you think the question is asking? (b) Is there a 
better term to include this concept (a concept that an interviewee described in the first question)? 
The entire interview process took 30 to 50 minutes. Interviewees received $25 in compensation 
after the interviews. 
Nine out of 27 questions were revised based on results of the pilot study. There were 
three common issues. First, the term, experts, was confusing to the participants. They were 
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uncertain what the term, experts, was referring to. They suggested several alternative terms, 
including experienced designers, professional designers, and design theorists. The term 
experienced designers was used to replace experts in Hofer’s questionnaire because it was more 
specific. The term design theorists was used to replace professors, scholars, or researchers in 
Hofer’s questionnaire. Second, two interviewees reported that the phrase real-world problems 
was too general; it was changed to real-life design problems in an updated version. Third, 
because the word truth was unclear to all interviewees, it was further revised as truth about 
design problems. The three interviewees also confirmed the clarity of these changed items 
through either emails or phone conversations. The final version of the questionnaire is presented 
in the Appendix A. 
Self-reported likelihood of contributions to a community. 
The variables of the self-reported contributions to a community were developed based on 
the point scheme (see Table 4) that was used in the community. Seven statements were used to 
describe various situations in which community members might post a comment. Participants 
were asked to rate how likely they were to submit a comment by using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = 
not at all likely to submit a comment; 5 = extremely likely to submit a comment). These 
statements described different levels of contributions to the community and different time 
requirements for putting effort into posting a comment. Likelihood of sharing low-level 
contributions represented zero points in the point scheme presented in Table 4, including asking 
questions or requesting clarification. Likelihood of sharing mid-level contributions represented 5 
and 10 points that concerned a typo or a criticism. Likelihood of sharing high-level contributions 
represented 20 and 50 points that were related to sharing tips, tutorials, and other useful 
resources. 
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Quantity and quality of contributions. 
Both quality and quantity of contributions were based on data gathered on the community 
site rather than through the survey. The researcher had access to the comment logs recorded by 
the site, which were matched to survey responses via the respondents’ email addresses. The 
quantity was represented by the total number of posted comments by users, and the quality was 
represented by the total points that each user received.  
 
Procedure 
An invitation to participate in the research was sent to 1001 community members through 
the email addresses that they provided when they applied for a community account. The 
invitation described the purpose of the study and clarified the requirements for participants. If 
they decided to participate in the study, they were told to click on the link provided in the 
invitation and then respond to the questionnaire. The process took participants approximately 15 
minutes to complete. A follow-up email was sent to potential participants one week after they 
received the first invitation.  
 
Analysis  
A quantitative approach was used to identify the structure of epistemic beliefs,  examine 
the differences of epistemic beliefs across levels of expertise, and test how these variables relate 
to users’ self-reported contributions and their actual behaviors. All analyses were conducted 
using SPSS 17.0. Missing values were deleted using the listwise method. The analysis began by 
reporting response rates and descriptive statistics for respondents’ personal profiles. The 
descriptive statistics included frequency distributions of respondents’ age, gender, levels of 
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experience with software, years of experience in the profession, and frequency of using the 
software.  
In order to identify the structure of epistemic beliefs, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) 
was conducted. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) described the goals of factor analysis (FA) in the 
following: 
The specific goals of PCA or FA are to summarize patterns of correlations among 
observed variables, to reduce a large number of observed variables to a smaller number 
of factors, to provide an operational definition (a regression equation) for an underlying 
process by using observed variables, or to test a theory about the nature of underlying 
processes. (p. 608) 
 
Through the analysis, the number and type of latent variables that fit the data were found. 
Items with factor loadings above .4 were selected. For the extracted factors, Cronbach alpha 
reliability was measured.  
Next, factor scores were created by summing scores on variables that loaded highly on 
each factor. This method was suggested over using a regression approach to estimating factor 
scores, since the regression method capitalizes on chance relationships among variables, which 
results in biased factor-score estimates (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Regarding factors of 
epistemic beliefs and different measures of contributions, zero-order correlations were used in 
order to understand the strength and direction of their linear relationships. The contributions to 
the community included five variables: self-reported likelihood of sharing low-level 
contributions, self-reported likelihood of mid-level contributions, self-reported likelihood of 
high-level contributions, quality of actual contributions, and quantity of actual contributions. 
Finally, in order to understand the relationship among levels of expertise, epistemic 
beliefs, and contributions— five regression analyses were conducted. The five contribution 
variables were the dependent variables. The independent variables were: age, gender, three 
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variables for levels of expertise (i.e., levels of experience with software, years of experience in 
the profession, and frequency of using the software), factors of epistemic beliefs, and interaction 
terms between three variables for levels of expertise and factors of epistemic beliefs.  
Two different methods of regression analysis, hierarchical regression and regression with 
backward selection, were conducted in this current research. Hierarchical regression analysis was 
used, in order to examine whether respondents’ levels of expertise, the factors of epistemic 
beliefs, and the interaction between the two components made a significant and unique 
contribution to the prediction of three different levels of self-reported contributions. Since the 
distribution of actual contributions was skewed, those who did not receive any points and posted 
only once between November, 2008 and March, 2009 were removed from the regression 
analyses. After removing these respondents, the distribution was closer to a normal distribution. 
Additionally, since the new data sets of quality (N=39) and quantity (N=73) of actual 
contributions were small, two regression analyses with backward selection were conducted, 
instead of hierarchical regression analyses, in order to decrease the degree of freedom.   
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Chapter 4 
Results 
This chapter presents an overview of the results of the study, a discussion of the sample, 
and the detailed results of statistical analyses that addressed the following research questions: 
1. What is the structure of domain-focused epistemic beliefs relative to the structure, 
stability, source, and justification of knowledge in the field of design? 
 
2. How do demographic characteristics – age, gender, expertise – relate to individual 
levels of contribution to an online community of practice hosted by a firm?  
 
3. How do individuals’ design-focused epistemic beliefs relate to their levels of 
contribution to an online community of practice hosted by a firm? 
 
4. How does the interaction between expertise and design-focused epistemic beliefs 
relate to individual levels of contribution to an online community of practice hosted 
by a firm? 
 
Results are organized first by method use, then by research question. First, results of 
exploratory factor analysis are shown for the purpose of discovering the structure of epistemic 
beliefs. Next, findings from correlation and five regression analyses are presented. Finally, the 
presentation of the results is organized by the research questions.  
 
Structure of Epistemic Beliefs 
The following section details the results of structural analyses of each of the scales used 
in the current study, including results of principal axis factor analysis and internal consistency 
reliability analysis. The findings then lead to a discussion of the differences between the factors 
identified in this current study and the factors found in the Hofer (2000) and Wood and Kardash 
(2002) studies.   
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Exploratory factor analysis. 
Appendix B presents the means and standard deviations for each of the items used to 
define the epistemic beliefs factors. In this research, missing values were deleted using a listwise 
method. Most values of the inter-item correlation were in the low to moderate range. The data 
were analyzed using principal axis factor analysis (PAF). The Kaiser criterion and scree plot 
were used to estimate the number of factors to extract. There were 10 eigenvalues greater than 1 
that accounted for 61.4 percent of the total variance.  
 
Figure 3. Scree plot of factors.  
In social science data analysis, it is not unusual to extract several factors; however, the 
more factors extracted, the less parsimonious the solution (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Rather 
than using eigenvalue over one, a scree test of eigenvalues plotted against factors is another 
method often used to determine the number of factors. The point at which a line drawn through 
the points changes slope is the number of factors that is suggested for extraction. As shown in 
Figure 3, the scree plot appeared to support two to five factors. Since a four-factor solution was 
2 Factors 5 Factors 
6 Factors
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suggested by the theoretical structure of the scale, four factors were extracted and they accounted 
for 34.7 percent of the total variance. Principal factors extraction with direct oblimin rotation was 
performed on 27 items for the sample of 286 respondents. Oblique rotation allows for the 
existence of correlations between factors. Four factors with high loadings (>.4) were identified, 
and high cross-loadings (>.3) are reported in Table 9. Thirteen of 27 items did not load on any 
factor. These items included questions regarding beliefs about first-hand experience, justification 
of design principles, and individual construction of meaning. Using these methods, the four 
factors extracted were labeled (a) Consistency of Design Knowledge, (b) Source Authority of 
Design Knowledge, (c) Attainability of Design Knowledge, and (d) Contextual Factuality of 
Design Knowledge. 
 
  
 
Table 9  
Factor Loadings for Exploratory Factor Analysis With Direct Oblimin Rotation of Epistemic Beliefs 
 Item 
Pattern  Structure 
Consistency 
of Design 
Knowledge 
Source 
Authority 
of Design 
Knowledge 
Attainability 
of Design 
Knowledge 
Contextual 
Factuality of 
Design 
Knowledge 
 Consistency 
of Design 
Knowledge 
Source 
Authority 
of Design 
Knowledge 
Attainability 
of Design 
Knowledge 
Contextual 
Factuality of 
Design 
Knowledge 
1: Theories are unchanging in the field of design. 
-.52    
 -.52    
5: All design theorists would probably come up with the same 
solutions to problems. -.56    
 
-.61   (.37) 
9: Most of what is true in the field of design is already known. 
-.50    
 -.54 (.30)   
18: Principles in the field of design are unchanging. 
-.55    
 -.53    
24: All experts in design understand the field in the same way. 
-.49    
 -.55 (.33)   
7: If you read something in a book for design, you can be sure it is 
true.  .53   
 
 .55   
8: A theory in design is accepted as correct if experts reach 
consensus.  .45   
 
 .48   
20: If my personal experience conflicts with ideas in a book, the 
book is probably right.  .68   
 
 .66   
26: I am most confident that I know something when I know what 
the experts think.  .44   
 
 .44   
22: Expertise in the field of design consists of seeing the 
interrelationships among ideas.   .44  
 
  .43  
23: Solutions to problems in design change as experts gather more 
information.   .49  
 
  .49  
 
    
   (continued) 
86 
  
 
Table 9 (continued) 
 
 
 
 Item 
Pattern  Structure 
Consistency 
of Design 
Knowledge 
Source 
Authority 
of Design 
Knowledge 
Attainability 
of Design 
Knowledge 
Contextual 
Factuality of 
Design 
Knowledge 
 Consistency 
of Design 
Knowledge 
Source 
Authority 
of Design 
Knowledge 
Attainability 
of Design 
Knowledge 
Contextual 
Factuality of 
Design 
Knowledge 
27: First-hand experience is the best way of knowing something in 
design.   .41  
 
  .41  
12: Correct solutions in the field of design are more a matter of 
opinion than fact.    .51 
 
   .49 
21: There is really no way to determine whether someone has the 
right solution in design.    .53 
 
   .53 
87 
 88 
 
Descriptive statistics for factors of epistemic beliefs. 
There were 5 items in Consistency of Design Knowledge, 4 items in Source Authority of 
Design Knowledge, 3 items in Attainability of Design Knowledge, and 2 items in Contextual 
Factuality of Design Knowledge. Factor scores were calculated by adding item scores together. 
Consistency and Source Authority of Design Knowledge had a medium correlation (r=.34, 
p<.01). Attainability and Contextual Factuality of Design Knowledge were both not significantly 
correlated with any other factors of epistemic beliefs. The Cronbach  ranged from .47 to .69. 
Consistency and Source Authority of Design Knowledge had higher internal consistency than 
Attainability and Contextual Factuality of Design Knowledge. These findings and the 
implications are discussed at length in Chapter 5. Table 10 presents the descriptive statistics and 
Cronbach . 
Table 10 
Descriptive Statistics and Reliability of Factors of Epistemic Beliefs 
Factor 1 2 3 4 
1. Consistency of Design Knowledge  1    
2. Source Authority of Design Knowledge .34** 1   
3. Attainability of Design Knowledge -.04 -.08 1  
4. Contextual Factuality of Design Knowledge -.01 .01 -.03 1 
Number of items 5 4 3 2 
M 10.54 10.15 11.83 6.14 
SD 3.14 2.35 1.54 1.64 
Cronbach  .69 .61 .47 .52 
Note: **p < .01. 
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Comparison to previous studies using similar factors. 
The four factors of epistemic beliefs that emerged were somewhat different from Hofer’s 
(2000) findings. Consistency of design knowledge included items that were related to both 
certainty and simplicity of knowledge. Similar to Hofer’s findings, the current study found that 
beliefs about certainty and simplicity of knowledge were not two separate factors. They were 
instead one combined factor in which knowledge is viewed as fixed, unchanging, unambiguous, 
and consistent across design experts. All of the items in the Consistency of Design Knowledge 
factor from this study also loaded on certain/simple knowledge in Hofer’s study (see Table 11).  
The second factor, Source Authority of Design Knowledge, reflects that knowledge 
comes from an authority, such as books or an expert. If an individual’s knowledge conflicts with 
that of an authority, the individual is more likely to accept the ideas conveyed by the authority. 
All items in this factor were also loaded on the source of knowledge: authority in Hofer’s study, 
except item 8 which was not loaded on any factors in Hofer’s study. However, this item is 
clearly related to how people think of the knowledge distributed from an authority.  
In terms of the third factor, similar to findings in both Hofer’s study and in Wood and 
Kardash (2002), the three items of Attainability of Design Knowledge emerged as one single 
factor. This factor represents both how individuals and experts acquire design knowledge and the 
degree of difficulty experienced in attaining that knowledge. High scores represent the view that 
design knowledge needs more effort to be acquired and that objectivity does not exist. However, 
the factor, Attainability of Design Knowledge, is to some extent different from the original factor 
of the two previous studies. As shown in Table 11, items in this research were different from 
those items loaded on attainability of truth in Hofer’s study. The difference might also contribute 
to the low internal consistency in this factor. Hofer’s and Wood and Kardash’s factors focused 
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on the attainment of objective truth. The factor in the present study was concerned with beliefs 
about design knowledge, which had a broader perspective.  
The fourth factor, Contextual Factuality of Design Knowledge, reflects how individuals 
assess knowledge and decide which solutions are correct. While the Contextual Factuality in the 
current study was very close to justification for knowing: personal in Hofer’s study, this study 
did not include the belief about first-hand experience, which was covered by items 25 and 27. 
Since the last two factors, Attainability of Design Knowledge and Contextual Factuality of 
Design Knowledge, had very low internal consistencies and were not reliable, the factors were 
not entered in the regression analyses. This provided a cleaner and more reliable result for the 
regression analyses.  
Table 11 
Comparison of Factors in This Study and in Hofer’s Study 
Factor Items in  
this current research 
Items in  
Hofer’s (2000) study 
Compare this study with Hofer (2000) 
Consistency of Design Knowledge  1, 5, 9, 18, 24 1, 2, 5, 9, 11, 18, 23,24 All items from this research were loaded 
on certain/simple knowledge in Hofer’s 
study.  
Source Authority of Design 
Knowledge 
7, 8, 20, 26 3, 7, 20, 26 • Item 8 was not loaded on any of Hofer’s 
factors. 
• Other 3 items were all loaded on source 
of knowledge: authority in Hofer’s 
study. 
Attainability of Design Knowledge 22, 23, 27 13, 17 Factor in this study focused on the 
attainment of “Design Knowledge” vs. 
attainment of “Facts” in Hofer’s factor. 
Contextual Factuality of Design 
Knowledge 
12, 21 12, 21, 25, 27 Items from this research were loaded on 
justification for knowing: personal in 
Hofer’s study. However, the factor in this 
study focused only on the contextual 
characteristic of design knowledge but not 
first-hand experience. 
 
 
 
 91 
 
Modeling the Relations Between Age, Gender, Level of Expertise, Epistemic Beliefs, and 
Contributions  
 
The following section first presents the descriptive statistics for all variables, including 
means, standard deviations, and correlations between variables. Next, findings from the 
regression analyses are shown, including three hierarchical regression analyses for self-reported 
likelihood of contributions and two hierarchical regression analyses with backward selection for 
participants’ quality and quantity of actual contributions. The findings from these regression 
analyses are then further explored in relation to the above-referenced research questions, 
including the relations between demographic characteristics and individual level of contributions, 
the relations between individuals’ design-focused epistemic beliefs and contributions, and the 
interaction between expertise and design-focused epistemic beliefs in relation to contributions. 
Due to the low internal consistency of Attainability of Design Knowledge and Contextual 
Factuality of Design Knowledge, these two factors of epistemic beliefs were not included in the 
following analyses. 
Descriptive statistics for age, gender, level of expertise, epistemic beliefs, and 
contributions. 
 
Scores of self-reported likelihood of contributions were averaged by their corresponding 
items (Item 1 and 2 in section III in Appendix A). Low-level contributions were the postings 
provided when individuals had questions about using the software or needed clarification about a 
help page. Mid-level contributions were the postings provided when individuals found typos or 
disagreed with the information published on a help page. High-level contributions were the 
postings provided when individuals found relevant tips or information from other sources, had 
ideas of how to enhance content, or wanted to share relevant instructions they had created. 
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In terms of average scores of self-reported likelihood of sharing contributions, people 
rated the low-level and high-level contributions higher than the mid-level ones (see Table 12). 
More specifically, the average likelihood of sharing was lowest when people found a typo or 
disagreed with information on a help page. In addition, the average scores for quality and 
quantity of actual contributions were both around one. This was due to the skewed distribution of 
quality and quantity of contribution. Most people posted only once (73.4 percent) and received 
zero points (86.1 percent).  
In terms of correlations between the demographic variables, there was no significant 
correlation between age and gender. Correlations showed that the three variables for levels of 
expertise had medium correlations with each other, ranging from .33 to .57. For the epistemic 
beliefs, as expected, higher scores of Consistency of Design Knowledge were associated with 
higher scores of Source Authority of Design Knowledge (r = .34, p < .01) (see Table 10). For the 
five contribution variables, quality of actual contributions was positively and significantly 
associated with the likelihood of sharing high-level contributions (r = .17, p <.01); quantity of 
actual contributions was associated with the likelihood of sharing mid-level contributions (r = 
.19, p < .01). However, quality and quantity of actual contributions were not significantly 
correlated with the likelihood of sharing low-level contributions. 
In this paragraph, the correlations between all of the independent variables and the five 
contribution variables are presented. In terms of the demographic variables, age did not correlate 
with any of the contribution variables. However, for gender, correlations revealed that females 
reported a higher likelihood of sharing low-level contributions (r = .14, p < .05), and males 
reported a higher likelihood of sharing mid-level contributions (r = -.14, p < .05). Although the 
three variables for levels of expertise had medium correlations with each other, they related 
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differently to the contributions. Levels of experience using software was significantly and 
positively correlated with quality of contributions (r = .15, p < .05). More years of experience in 
the design profession was associated with a lower likelihood of sharing low-level contributions 
(r = -.14, p < .05) and higher quality of contributions (r = .12, p < .05). Higher frequency of 
using the software was significantly and positively correlated with the likelihood of sharing both 
mid-level contributions (r = .22, p < .01) and high-level contributions (r = .14, p < .05). In terms 
of epistemic beliefs, Consistency was negatively correlated with quantity of contributions (r = -
.14, p < .05); Source Authority of Design Knowledge did not correlate with any contribution 
variable. 
For the correlations between levels of expertise and epistemic beliefs, levels of 
experience with the software was negatively associated with Source Authority of Design 
Knowledge (r = -.18, p < .01). As expected, more experience in the design profession was 
associated with lower scores of Consistency (r = -.13, p < .05) and lower scores of Source 
Authority (r = -.26, p < .01). Noticeably, frequency of using the software did not correlate with 
any of the epistemic belief variables.
  
 
Table 12 
Correlations Between Contributions and Factors of Epistemic Beliefs 
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
1. Age 1            
2. Gender .04 1           
3. Levels of Experience with Software -.14* -.13* 1          
4. Years of Experience in the Profession .13* -.01 .57** 1         
5. Frequency of Using the Software .03 -.05 .47** .33** 1        
6. Consistency of Design Knowledge -.22** -.05 -.01 -.13* .02 1       
7. Source Authority of Design Knowledge -.21** -.05 -.18** -.26** -.06 .35** 1      
8. Likelihood of Sharing Low-level 
Contributions .04 .14* -.10 -.14* .08 .01 .04 1     
9. Likelihood of Sharing Mid-level 
Contributions -.01 -.14* .09 .06 .22** -.11 .01 .29** 1    
10. Likelihood of Sharing High-level 
Contributions .05 -.11 .03 .03 .14* -.07 .00 .41** .43** 1   
11. Quality of Contributions .01 -.05 .15* .12* .07 -.01 -.02 -.03 .06 .17** 1  
12. Quantity of Contributions .07 -.07 .05 .03 .10 -.14* -.02 -.10 .19** .07 .047 1 
M 43.23 - 3.73 3.97 4.13 10.50 10.17 3.50 2.76 3.06 1.05 1.67 
SD 13.12 - .94 1.92 1.12 3.19 2.38 .83 .87 .86 4.32 2.26 
Note: Gender is coded male = 1, female = 2 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
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Regression analysis for self-reported likelihood of contributions and actual 
contributions. 
 
Three separate hierarchical regression analyses for self-reported likelihood of 
contributions and two regression analyses for actual contributions with backward selection were 
conducted. Different methods were used due to the skewed distribution of quality and quantity of 
actual contributions. More discussion about this issue is presented in Chapter 3.  
Self-reported likelihood of contributions. Three hierarchical regression analyses were 
used to examine whether each of the following four sets of variables made a significant and 
unique contribution to the prediction of self-reported likelihood of providing contributions. For 
each analysis, two demographic variables, gender and age, were first entered into the equation as 
a block. Next, the three variables for levels of expertise were entered as a block (levels of 
experience with software, years of experience in the profession, and frequency of using the 
software) to determine whether they accounted for a statistically significant increase in the 
amount of variance after the control variables had first been entered. In the third step, after 
controlling for gender, age, and levels of expertise, two factor scores of epistemic beliefs were 
entered to investigate whether the variables made a statistically significant contribution to 
explain self-reported likelihood of contributions. The last block comprised six first-order 
interaction terms between levels of expertise and epistemic beliefs. Missing values were 
removed using listwise deletion. Eleven outliers for low-level contributions, seven outliers for 
mid-level contributions, and nine outliers for high-level contributions were also removed. This 
resulted in a total size of 264 respondents for all three self-reported likelihood of contributions. 
Table 13 presents the summary of hierarchical regression analyses for the variables that predict 
self-reported likelihood of contributions. 
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Table 13 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting Self-reported Likelihood 
of Contributions (N = 264) 
Independent Variables 
 
Dependent Variables: Contributions 
 
Self-reported likelihood 
of sharing low-level 
contributions 
 
Self-reported likelihood 
of sharing mid-level 
contributions 
 
Self-reported likelihood 
of sharing high-level 
contributions 
 
Step 1 - Demographic Information 
 R2 0.039** .022† .025* 
Gender .198** -.146* -.149* 
Age -.021 -.011 .056 
    
Step 2 – Levels of expertise 
 R2 0.069*** .059** .039* 
Gender .193** -.146* -.154* 
Age -.003 -.024 .039 
Levels of experience with the software 
(LE) -.052 -.075 -.084 
Years of experience in the profession 
(YE) -.223** -.028 -.009 
Frequency of using the software (Fq) .194** .272*** .222** 
    
Step 3 – Epistemic Beliefs 
 R2 0.008 .030* .022* 
Gender .201** -.147* -.159** 
Age .014 -.041 .021 
Levels of experience with the software 
(LE) -.040 -.064 -.074 
Years of experience in the profession 
(YE) -.209** -.038 -.017 
Frequency of using the software (Fq) .189** .276*** .227** 
Consistency of Design Knowledge (C) .009 -.183** -.157* 
Source Authority of Design Knowledge 
(SA) .089 .098 .071 
    
Step 4 – Interaction between Epistemic Beliefs and Levels of expertise 
 R2 0.044* .033 .034 
Gender .208** -.145* -.151* 
Age -.001 -.042 .021 
Levels of experience with the software 
(LE) -.773* -.627
† .705† 
Years of experience in the profession 
(YE) .243 .054 -.778* 
Frequency of using the software (Fq) .607† .184 -.303 
Consistency of Design Knowledge (C) .005 -.533† -.078 
Source Authority of Design Knowledge 
(SA) -.050 -.194 -.071 
C * LE 1.263** 1.049* -.090 
C * YE -.406 -.237 .283 
C * Fq -1.051** -.461 -.205 
SA * LE -.066 -.118 -.855* 
SA * YE -.097 .124 .526 
SA * Fq .365 .512 .807* 
    
Total R2 .160 .143 .120 
N 264 264 264 
Note. Standardized regression coefficients are shown; gender is coded male = 1, female = 2. 
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001 
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With respect to the likelihood of sharing low-level contributions, demographic variables 
accounted for a significant part of the variance, F change (2, 261) = 5.302, p < .01. The three 
variables regarding levels of expertise accounted for 6.9 percent of the variability in the 
likelihood of sharing low-level contributions (p < .001). The subsequent entry of the two factors 
of epistemic beliefs did not result in a statistically significant increase in the explanation of the 
contributions, F change (2, 256) = .008, p > .05. Finally, interaction terms accounted for a 
significant part of the variance, F change (6, 250) = 2.180, p < .05. The overall model explained 
the likelihood of providing low-level contributions, F (13, 250) = 3.654, p < .001, R2 = .160. 
For the likelihood of sharing mid-level contributions, demographic variables did not 
account for a significant part of the variance. As with the likelihood of sharing low-level 
contributions, the three variables for levels of expertise accounted for 5.9 percent of the 
variability (p < .001). As predicted, the subsequent entry of the two factors of epistemic beliefs 
resulted in a statistically significant increase in the explanation of the contributions (p < .05), 
explaining an additional 3 percent of the variability, F change (2, 256) = 4.344, p < .05. 
Interaction terms did not account for a significant part of the variance, F change (6, 250) = 1.589, 
p > .05. The overall model explained the self-reported likelihood of sharing mid-level 
contributions, F (13, 250) = 3.222, p < .001, R2 = .143. 
In terms of the likelihood of sharing high-level contributions, demographic variables, 
levels of expertise, and the factors of epistemic beliefs all accounted for a significant part of the 
variance. Demographic variables accounted for a significant part of the variance, F change (2, 
261) = 3.287, p < .05. Levels of expertise accounted for 3.9 percent of the variability in the 
likelihood of sharing low-level contributions, F change (3, 258) = 3.575, p < .05. The subsequent 
entry of the two factors of epistemic beliefs resulted in a statistically significant increase in the 
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explanation of the contributions, explaining an additional 2.2 percent of the variability, F change 
(2, 256) = 3.050, p < .05. Interaction terms between levels of expertise and epistemic beliefs did 
not account for a significant part of the variance, F change (6, 250) = 1.622, p > .05, after 
controlling for demographic variables, levels of expertise, and factors of epistemic beliefs. The 
overall model explained the likelihood of sharing high-level contributions, F (7, 250) = 2.611, p 
< .01, R2 = .120. 
Actual contributions. In terms of the actual contributions, two regression analyses with 
backward selection were conducted. Three variables regarding levels of expertise, two factors of 
epistemic beliefs, age, and gender were tested first. If any of the expertise variables were 
significant, the interaction terms were then entered in the regression analyses and tested again. 
For the quality of actual contributions, the overall model was significant and explained 27.7 
percent of the variance, F (3, 34)=4.349, p < .05. As can be seen in Table 14, three variables 
significantly explained respondents’ quality of contributions at an alpha level of .05, including 
levels of experience with software, Consistency of Design Knowledge, and interaction between 
these two variables.  
Table 14  
Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Quality of Actual Contributions (N = 38) 
Independent Variables B SE B ß 
Constant 
 54.926 25.780  
Levels of experience with software (LE) 
 -13.276 6.178 -1.249* 
Consistency of Design Knowledge (C) 
 -6.071 2.468 -1.993* 
LE * C 
 1.671 .603 2.474** 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
The results for quantity of actual contributions are presented in Table 15. The overall 
model was significant and explained 29.4 percent of the variance, F (4, 68)=7.068, p < .001. Five 
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variables significantly explained respondents’ quantity of actual contributions at an alpha level of 
.05, including levels of experience with software, years of experience in the profession, and three 
interaction terms between Consistency of Design Knowledge and expertise variables. Detailed 
discussion about each individual variable is presented in the following section.  
Table 15 
Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Quantity of Actual Contributions (N = 73) 
Independent Variables B SE B ß 
Constant 
 2.830 .805  
Levels of experience with the software (LE) 
 2.231 .489 1.124*** 
Years of experience in the profession (YE) 
 -1.820 .412 -2.102*** 
C* LE  
 -.171 .042 -1.544*** 
C * YE  
 .140 .039 1.889*** 
*** p < .001 
Age, gender, and contributions. 
Age and gender were both tested with five regression analyses. Age was not significant 
across all types of contributions. However, gender was significant in the self-reported likelihood 
of sharing different levels of contributions, although not in the actual contributions (see Table 13, 
Step 1). With respect to the likelihood of sharing low-level contributions, males reported that 
they would be less likely to ask questions, and females reported that they would be more likely to 
ask questions and for clarification (β = .198, p < .01). For both mid-level (β = -.146, p < .05) and 
high-level contributions (β = -.149, p < .05), male participants were more likely than female 
participants to report that they would post comments. This indicated that male participants 
believed that they were more likely to post a comment when they found a typo, disagreed with 
information published on a help page, found relevant tips from other sources, or wanted to share 
relevant instructions that they had created.  
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Levels of expertise and contributions. 
Levels of expertise included three variables: (a) levels of experience with software, (b) 
years of experience in the profession, and (c) frequency of using the software. First, levels of 
experience with the software was not significant for all three levels of self-reported likelihood of 
sharing contributions (see Table 13, Step 2), but the variable was significant for both quality (see 
Table 14) and quantity of actual contributions (see Table 15). There was an interaction between 
levels of experience with the software and belief about Consistency of Design Knowledge on 
quality and quantity of actual contributions. More findings are reported in the later section about 
interaction between levels of expertise and epistemic beliefs in relation to contributions. 
Years of experience in the profession was significant for the self-reported likelihood of 
sharing low-level contributions and quantity of actual contributions. The longer the individuals 
had worked in the profession (β = -.223, p < .01), the less likely they were to ask a question 
online (see Table 13, Step 2). There was also an interaction with belief about Consistency of 
Design Knowledge for quantity of contributions. More findings can be found in the later section 
about interaction between levels of expertise and epistemic beliefs in relation to contributions.  
The frequency of using the software was positively associated with the likelihood of 
sharing low-level (β = .194, p < .01), mid-level (β = .272, p < .001), and high-level contributions 
(β = .222, p < .01), but not the quality and quantity of actual contributions. The more frequently 
participants used the software, the more likely they were to post a comment when they had a 
question, needed clarification, found a typo, disagreed with information published on a help page, 
found relevant tips from other sources, or wanted to share relevant instructions that they had 
created (see Table 13, Step 2). 
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Epistemic beliefs and contributions. 
With regard to epistemic beliefs, Consistency of Design Knowledge was the only 
significant explanatory variable for all types of contributions. As expected, the factor was 
negatively associated with likelihood of sharing mid-level contributions (β = -.183, p < .01), 
likelihood of sharing high-level contributions (β = -.157, p < .05) (see Table 13, Step 3), and 
quality of actual contributions (β = -1.993, p < .05) (see Table 14). The less individuals believed 
in consistency of design knowledge, the more likely they were to post a comment when they 
found a typo, disagreed with information published on a help page, found relevant tips from 
other sources, or wanted to share relevant instructions they had created. The belief also had an 
interaction with levels of the expertise in relation to quality and quantity of contributions. The 
detailed findings are reported in the next section. 
Interaction between levels of expertise and epistemic beliefs and contributions. 
Interaction for likelihood of sharing low-level contributions. For the effects of 
interaction between expertise and epistemic beliefs, after controlling for individuals’ age, gender, 
levels of expertise, and epistemic beliefs, the last step was only significant for the likelihood of 
sharing low-level contributions. The interaction between Consistency of Design Knowledge and 
levels of experience with the software was positively associated with the likelihood of sharing 
low-level contributions (β = 1.263, p < .01) (see Table 13, Step 4); however, the interaction 
between Consistency of Design Knowledge and frequency of using the software was negatively 
associated with the likelihood of sharing low-level contributions (β = -1.051, p < .01) (see Table 
13, Step 4).  
In order to further understand the relation between the belief in consistency of design 
knowledge, levels of experience with software, and years of experience in design, four regression 
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lines of different levels of experience with the software were drawn (Figure 4). For each level of 
experience, participants’ likelihood of sharing low-level contributions was examined at the mean 
for Consistency of Design Knowledge (10.52), at one standard deviation above the mean (13.65) 
and at one standard deviation below the mean (7.39). Each small graph in the Figure represents 
different frequencies of using the software, including daily, weekly, 2 to 3 times per month, and 
monthly.  
As indicated in Figure 4, in general, individuals at the average level of belief in 
consistency of design knowledge had a similar likelihood of sharing low-level contributions, 
regardless of their levels of experience. However, the more frequently they used the software, the 
less likely they were to provide the low-level contributions. In terms of different levels of belief 
in consistent knowledge, the more experience those with a strong belief (above the mean) in 
consistent knowledge had with the software, the more likely they were to post comments when 
they had a question about using the software or needed clarification on a help page. On the 
contrary, the less experience those with a weak belief (below the mean) in consistent knowledge 
had with the software, the more likely they were to post comments when they had a question. 
Comparing the four graphs with different frequencies of using software, advanced users 
and experts with a stronger belief in consistent knowledge had a higher likelihood of sharing 
low-level contributions than those with a weaker belief, regardless of their frequency of using the 
software. For beginner and intermediate users who used the software at least weekly, the more 
they believed in consistency of design knowledge, the less likely they were to share the low-level 
contributions; however, when they did not use the software as often, a weaker belief in 
consistency of design knowledge was related to a slightly higher likelihood of sharing the low-
level contributions.  
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Figure 4. Interaction between frequencies of using software, levels of experience with software, 
and consistency of knowledge for low-level contributions. 
 
Interaction for quality of actual contributions. The regression analysis revealed 
significant interactions between Consistency of Design Knowledge and level of experience with 
software (β = 2.474, p < .05) on quality of contributions. A similar graph was drawn in order to 
understand how the relationship between different levels of experience with the software and 
quality of contributions would depend on an individual’s belief in consistent knowledge. Four 
regression lines of different levels of experience with the software were drawn. For each level of 
experience, participants’ likelihood of sharing low-level contributions was examined at the mean 
for Consistency of Design Knowledge (10.52), at one standard deviation above the mean (13.65), 
and at one standard deviation below the mean (7.39). In general, when experts believed in 
consistent knowledge at an average or above the average level, they had higher quality 
contributions than less experienced users. Interestingly, when experts had a weak belief (below 
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the mean) in consistent knowledge, the quality of their contributions was similar to that of users 
with less experience. In addition, experts and advanced users contributed higher quality 
comments when they had a stronger believe in consistent knowledge. This unexpected result is 
further discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
Figure 5. Interaction between levels of experience with the software and consistency of 
knowledge for quality of contributions. 
 
Interaction for quantity of actual contribution. The regression analysis revealed 
significant interactions between Consistency of Design Knowledge and level of experience with 
software (β = -1.544, p < .001), and between Consistency of Design Knowledge and years of 
experience in design (β = 1.889, p < .001) on quantity of contributions. Using the same method 
to understand the relation between belief in consistent knowledge and the two variables 
regarding levels of expertise, four regression lines of different levels of experience with the 
software were drawn. For each level of experience, participants’ quantity of contributions was 
examined at the mean for Consistency of Design Knowledge (10.37), at one standard deviation 
above the mean (13.46), and at one standard deviation below the mean (7.28) (see Figure 6). 
From the interaction plot in Figure 6, it can be seen that the relation between levels of 
experience and quantity of individuals’ contributions differed based on an individual’s belief 
about Consistency of Design Knowledge. In general, those with consistent knowledge scores 
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above the mean provided approximately the same number of contributions, regardless of their 
levels of experience with the software. In contrast, those with consistent knowledge scores at or 
below the mean and with more software experience provided more contributions.   
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Interaction between years of experience in design, levels of experience with software, 
and consistency of knowledge for quantity of contributions.  
 
Regardless of the number of years of experience in the design profession, expert and 
advanced users with consistent knowledge scores at or below the mean contributed more than 
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those with a strong belief in consistency of design knowledge. When they were new to the design 
field, beginner and intermediate users had the same results as expert and advanced users. The 
less they believed in consistent knowledge, the more contributions they provided. However, for 
beginner and intermediate users with more experience in the design field, those with consistent 
knowledge scores at or below the average level contributed fewer comments than those with a 
strong belief. An in-depth discussion of the implications of these findings is presented in Chapter 
5. 
In summary, the tested model explained actual contributions well, including 27.7 percent 
of the variance for quality of contributions and 29.4 percent of the variance for quantity of 
contributions. With respect to the self-reported likelihood of contributions, the tested model 
explained the low-level contributions (R2=.160) best, followed by mid-level contributions 
(R2=.143). The model only accounted for 12 percent of the variance in the high-level 
contributions. 
Age was not a significant explanatory variable for the self-reported likelihood of 
contributions, quality, and quantity of contributions. Gender was significantly associated with all 
types of self-reported likelihood of contributions. Females were more likely to report that they 
would post a comment when they had a question or needed some clarification. In contrast, males 
were more likely to report that they would post a comment when they found typos and wanted to 
share instructions.  
Considering levels of expertise, levels of experience with the software were not 
significant for three levels of self-reported likelihood of contributions, but the variable was 
significant for both quality and quantity of actual contributions. In contrast, frequency of using 
the software was positively associated with the low-level, mid-level, and high-level contributions, 
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but not the quality and quantity of contributions. The more frequently individuals used the 
software, the more likely they are to report a higher likelihood of providing contributions. In 
addition, the longer the individuals had worked in the profession, the less likely they were to 
share low-level contributions. 
In terms of epistemic beliefs, Consistency of Design Knowledge was the only significant 
explanatory variable for all types of contributions. This factor was negatively associated with the 
likelihood of sharing mid-level and high-level contributions and quality of actual contributions. 
As expected, the less individuals believed in consistency of design knowledge, the more likely 
they were to share low-level and high-level contributions. 
With respect to interaction between epistemic beliefs and levels of expertise, the 
interaction with level of experience with software was positively associated with the likelihood 
of sharing low-level contributions and quality of contributions, and negatively associated with 
quantity of contributions. The interaction with years of experience was positively associated with 
quantity of contributions. The interaction with frequency of using the software was only 
significant for explaining quantity of contributions. An in-depth discussion of the implications of 
these findings and how the present results compare to past research findings is presented in 
Chapter 5.   
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Chapter 5 
Discussion 
This study explored the relationship between individuals’ levels of expertise, their 
epistemic beliefs, and their contributions to an online community of practice. As the literature in 
Chapter 2 revealed, several previous studies have researched the relationship between epistemic 
beliefs and online behaviors for high school students (e.g., Mason & Boldrin, 2008) and college 
students (e.g., Jacobson & Spiro, 1995). They found that epistemic beliefs influence individuals’ 
problem-solving performance (Oh & Jonassen, 2007) and information-seeking behaviors (Hofer, 
2004; Schommer, 1998; Whitmire, 2003), and that they may also influence how individuals 
communicate within online learning environments (Bråten, Strømsø, & Samuelstuen, 2005); 
Bråten & Strømsø, 2006). This present research has extended the traditional research on 
epistemic beliefs by demonstrating how individuals’ beliefs in ways of knowing design 
knowledge can operate as frameworks in an online community of practice beyond school 
settings. 
This chapter details the conclusions of the study and implications for theories, future 
research, and the design of an online community of practice. 
 
Conclusions 
The results of this study confirmed some findings from past research and uncovered some 
surprising and interesting issues, which are further discussed in this section. There are six 
primary conclusions that add to the limited body of research in the area of epistemic beliefs and 
an online community of practice hosted by a firm. First, a four-factor structure was a plausible 
but somewhat flawed instrument for studying epistemic beliefs for design knowledge. Second, 
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the proposed model used in the study had different explanatory powers in relation to variability 
within self-reported likelihood of sharing contributions than within quality and quantity of actual 
contributions. Third, differences in contributions by gender were limited. Fourth, among the 
three variables which constituted levels of expertise, frequency of using the software best 
explained self-reported likelihood of contributions; levels of experience with the software best 
accounted for actual contributions. Fifth, belief about consistency of design knowledge had 
different relations with different measures of contributions. Finally, interaction between belief 
about consistency of design knowledge and levels of expertise explained contributions in the 
community of practice that was studied in this research.  
Conclusion 1: A four-factor structure of epistemic beliefs about the nature of design 
knowledge and knowing was found but needed improvement. 
 
In order to explore the nature of epistemic beliefs about design knowledge and ways of 
knowing, this study followed conventional scale construction procedures to validate the 
measurement of individuals’ beliefs. First, Hofer’s DEBQ was adapted to specifically address 
design problems and solutions. Second, a pilot study was conducted to confirm that survey 
questions were design-focused and understandable. Third, exploratory factor analysis was 
conducted in order to find a structure of the beliefs that fit the data set. Factor analyses indicated 
a four-factor model (Consistency of Design Knowledge, Source Authority of Design Knowledge, 
Attainability of Design Knowledge, and Contextual Factuality of Design Knowledge).  
The four factors of epistemic beliefs about the nature of design knowledge and knowing 
are partially consistent with Hofer (2000). Almost all items in the first two factors, Consistency 
and Source Authority of Design Knowledge, were loaded on certain knowledge and source of 
knowledge: authority in Hofer’s study. The only exception was Item 8 in Source Authority of 
Design Knowledge, which was not loaded on any of the factors from Hofer’s study.  
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The Attainability of Design Knowledge factor is similar to attainability of truth in 
Hofer’s study and Wood and Kardash (2002). Their factors focused on the attainment of 
objective truth. However, the factor in the present study is concerned specifically with design 
knowledge. Noticeably, all three items in this factor were not loaded on attainment of truth in 
Hofer’s study, which may be one of the reasons that this factor had the lowest Cronbach alpha.  
Regarding Contextual Factuality of Design Knowledge, both items were loaded on 
justification for knowing: personal in Hofer’s study. Contextual Factuality here is to some extent 
more specific than the original factor that concluded in Hofer’s study. Justification in her study 
was comprised of a view of justification that values both firsthand experience and the contextual 
characteristic of knowledge. However, the factor in this current study is only concerned with the 
contextual characteristics of design knowledge. The difference is conceivably due to the different 
age groups between the respondents in this study and in Hofer’s study. Hofer contended that 
college students might be less capable of interpreting the meaning of some items that addressed 
sophisticated aspects of the justification for knowing. The issue of different capabilities of 
interpreting beliefs was also addressed in Schommer-Aikins (2002). 
The Cronbach alpha for these four factors ranged from .467 to .692. Even though a 
reliability of .70 or higher is desirable in quantitative research, the lower Cronbach alpha 
obtained in this current study is not surprising. Cronbach alphas of .50 are common in studies of 
epistemic beliefs. For example, the Cronbach alpha from Schommer’s (1993) four-factor 
structure ranged from .51 to .78. Jehng, Johnson, and Anderson (1993) obtained a Cronbach 
alpha of .42 to .59 from their five-factor structure. Finally, the five-factor structure used by 
Wood and Kardash (2002) resulted in a Cronbach alpha of .54 to .74. The instruments developed 
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in these three studies have been widely used in the field (see Chapter 2 for an in-depth 
discussion).  
The reliability of the four factors from the current study was close to what was found by 
Hofer (2000). Specifically, Consistency of Design Knowledge had a satisfactory Cronbach alpha, 
but was slightly lower than the factor from Hofer (.69 versus .74, respectively). Source Authority 
of Design Knowledge in this study also had a higher Cronbach alpha (.61 versus .51). 
Attainability and Contextual Factuality of Design Knowledge were less satisfactory and lower 
than those factors from Hofer’s study. Since the items in Attainability of Design Knowledge 
were different from what was found in Hofer, the lower reliability may indicate problems 
associated with adapting the original items to the design-focused items. Future research is needed 
to further investigate this issue. Moreover, Cronbach alpha highly depends on the length of the 
test (Schmitt, 1996), which may have partially contributed to the low reliability for Contextual 
Factuality. For example, if eight items are included in the factor and the correlation between 
items in Contextual Factuality is the same, the Cronbach alpha is .811. This example shows how 
the number of questions included in the analysis can greatly impact the Cronbach alpha.  
Though the reliability from this study is close to those reported in similar studies found in 
the literature, the reliability of the factors is still lower than desired, which indicates a need for 
further development of the instruments used to investigate epistemic beliefs. Until those 
instruments can be developed, factors with low reliability should be used cautiously. Therefore, 
the current study took a more conservative route to understanding the relation between 
individuals’ epistemic beliefs and knowledge contributions within the online community of 
practice by excluding those factors with low internal consistency (i.e., Attainability and 
Contextual Factuality of Design Knowledge) from the regression analyses.  
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In summary, a four-factor structure about design-focused epistemic beliefs was found in 
this current research. These findings suggested that epistemic beliefs could be used to understand 
an adult’s learning process. From a theoretical point of view, domain-specific beliefs are more 
appropriate for adults. Shommer-Aikins (2002) postulated, “As children are exposed to ideas 
from family, peers, culture, and formal education, their personal epistemology may become more 
domain specific…it is likely that as learners progress in their development they will acquire both 
domain-specific and domain-general epistemological beliefs” (p. 112). Based on the empirical 
findings from this study, a questionnaire developed for the purpose of understanding college 
students’ epistemic beliefs could be used to explore adults’ beliefs. However, Attainability of 
Design Knowledge requires further investigation about the construct validity.  
Conclusion 2: The proposed model had different explanatory power for different 
measures of contributions.  
The proposed model provided a satisfactory explanation for the variability of the quantity 
(27.7 percent of the variability) and quality (29.4 percent of the variability) of actual 
contributions. However, the model explained less of the variability in self-reported likelihood of 
sharing contributions, explaining 16 percent of the variability in low-level contributions, 14.3 
percent in mid-level contributions, and 12 percent in high-level contributions.  
Different types of contributions were found to be associated with different significant 
explanatory variables. For example, belief in Consistency was the main effect for the self-
reported likelihood of sharing mid-level and high-level contributions as well as for the quality of 
contributions, but it interacted with levels of expertise for self-reported likelihood of sharing 
low-level contributions and quantity of actual contributions. This finding shows that different 
characteristics existed not only between participants’ self-reported likelihood contributions and 
actual contributions, but also within different measures of self-reported likelihood of 
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contributions and within actual contributions. These five measures are different in nature. The 
distinctive characteristics between quality and quantity of contributions have also been addressed 
by the study from Peddibhotla and Subramani (2007). They found that quality and quantity of 
contributions are driven by different types of motivation. Constant, Sproull, and Kiesler (1996) 
also concluded a negative relationship between number of replies and reply usefulness. These 
contributions need to be understood differently, and perhaps require different community 
policies and incentives to encourage members’ participation.  
Conclusion 3: Gender had a relationship to three levels of self-reported likelihood of 
sharing contributions but did not have a relationship to their actual contributions.  
 
Findings from this study revealed that gender had a significant relationship to the self-
reported likelihood of sharing low-level contributions, which assessed how likely an individual 
was to post a comment when he had a question or needed clarification. According to the 
regression analysis of the low-level contributions, males reported that they were less likely to ask 
questions in the online community of practice, and females reported that they were more likely to 
post their questions or to request clarification. This may be explained in part by men having a 
higher degree of concern for ego and perceiving a higher degree of self-risk when seeking 
feedback (Miller & Karakowsky, 2005). Meanwhile, female respondents in this study could tend 
to apply more direct methods to obtain help, since the studied community was male-dominated. 
According to Holder (1996), when females entered a male-dominated job setting, they tended to 
apply more direct methods because they felt it was unlikely that they would receive complete 
and accurate information if they sought information indirectly.  
Gender was also a significant explanatory variable for likelihood of sharing mid-level and 
high-level contributions. Though males reported they were less likely than females to actively 
ask questions or request clarification, they reported they were more likely than females to 
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contribute to the design community when they found typos, disagreed with the information 
published on a help page, found relevant tips or information from other sources, had ideas of 
how to enhance content, or wanted to share relevant instructions they had created. Similar results 
were found in Siemsen, Roth, and Balasubramanian’s study (2008) of IT professionals, aircraft 
technicians, and line works, which indicated that males were more likely than females to share 
their knowledge.  
Noticeably, even though males reported that they were more likely to contribute their 
knowledge, gender was not a significant variable for actual contributions. In other words, there 
was only a gender difference in self-reported likelihood of contributing to the community but not 
a gender difference in actual contributions. This indicates that while males might hold more 
positive attitudes toward sharing their knowledge than females, these attitudes do not seem to 
affect actual behaviors. Since on-the-job, informal training happens frequently and online 
communities of practice have become an important learning environment in which to receive that 
training, it is encouraging to learn that gender and age do not explain individuals’ actual 
contributions.  
Conclusion 4: Frequency of using the software explained self-reported likelihood of 
sharing contributions and levels of experience with the software explained actual 
contributions.  
 
In order to comprehensively measure levels of expertise, this study included three criteria 
to evaluate expertise: levels of experience with the software, years of experience in the 
profession, and frequency of using the software. The first criterion examined how skillful an 
individual was in using the design software. Years of experience in the profession considered 
both expertise in the profession and expertise with the tool. In some cases, designers may have 
advanced knowledge about design but limited knowledge about how to use the technology to 
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present their design work and vice versa. The two types of knowledge may not have developed 
synchronously. Finally, since not all designers work full time in the field, the third criterion was 
a proxy to understand whether the respondents were amateurs or professionals. As expected, 
these three variables had moderate positive relationships. 
Not surprisingly, individuals with more years of experience in the profession reported 
that they were less likely to post a comment, if they had a question or needed clarification. A 
possible explanation may be that these individuals might have been more ego-defensive and 
tended not to ask questions in order to try to maintain their own perception of their own expertise. 
It might also be that people who have been in a profession longer have more resources to choose 
from, such as peers they might call with a question instead of having to rely on an online 
community of practice.  
Regarding frequency of using the software, all measures of self-reported likelihood of 
contributions were related to this variable. The more frequently individuals used the software, 
they reported that the more likely they were to ask questions, share errors they found on a help 
page, or share tips or instructions. A possible explanation is that those who used the software 
more often might have been more familiar with the community content and culture and might 
have felt more comfortable contributing to the studied community of practice. 
Additionally, the regression findings indicated that individuals’ software skills explained 
their quality and quantity of actual contributions. In general, the more experience they had with 
the software, the higher the quality and quantity of the contributions they provided. This is 
consistent with the finding in Constant et al. (1996) that people had more positive attitudes 
toward sharing when they felt that they were experts in the subject matter of a question. However, 
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the relationships depended on their belief in Consistency of Design Knowledge and years of 
experience in design. Further discussion is presented in the next section.  
Interestingly, frequency of using the software only explained self-reported likelihood of 
providing contributions, and level of experience with the software only explained actual 
contributions. This may imply that individuals may have had different considerations when they 
were asked about their attitude toward contributions than when they actually contributed their 
knowledge. This finding is important, since most previous studies have only researched 
individuals’ self-reported contributions but the results have often been assumed by the 
researchers to be generalizable to individuals’ actual contributions. However, since the findings 
in this study demonstrate that individual’s self-reported likelihood of sharing contributions might 
not precisely reflect individuals’ actual contribution behaviors, researchers in the field need to be 
more cautious about generalizing findings from the self-reported contributions. 
Conclusion 5: Belief about Consistency of Design Knowledge had different relations 
with different measures of contributions.  
 
In order to only use reliable factors to understand individuals’ contributions in an online 
community of practice hosted by a firm, two factors were removed from the regression analyses, 
Attainability and Contextual Factuality of Design Knowledge. This decision was believed to 
provide more trustworthy findings about individuals’ contributions. Of the two reliable factors of 
epistemic beliefs, Source Authority of Design Knowledge was not significant for all measures of 
contributions. However, Consistency of Design Knowledge was related to all measures of 
contributions.  
The belief about Consistency of Design Knowledge had a direct relation—or main 
effect—with the self-reported likelihood of sharing mid-level and high-level contributions and 
quality of their actual contributions. Consistency of Design Knowledge also interacted with other 
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expertise variables for likelihood of sharing low-level contributions and quantity of contributions. 
When individuals believed more in consistency of design knowledge, they were less likely to 
post a comment about typos, disagreement with the content in the community, relevant tips from 
other sources, or relevant instructions they had created. One possible explanation is that people 
might have hesitated to share their knowledge in the studied community when they believed that 
there was correct and incorrect knowledge and design knowledge was consistent (Ardichvili, 
Page, & Wentling, 2003). Further discussions about belief in Consistency of Design Knowledge 
and its interaction with other variables for levels of expertise are presented in the following 
section. 
Conclusion 6: Interaction between belief about Consistency of Design Knowledge 
and levels of expertise accounted for likelihood of sharing low-level contributions 
and actual contributions. 
 
The interactions between belief about Consistency of Design Knowledge and levels of 
expertise correlated with likelihood of sharing low-level contributions and quality and quantity 
of actual contributions. Belief in Consistency of Design Knowledge had interactions with levels 
of experience and with frequency of using the software in relation to likelihood of sharing low-
level contributions. In terms of level of experience with the software, more experienced 
participants at an above-average level of belief were more likely to post comments when they 
had questions or needed clarification. On the contrary, more experienced participants at a below-
average level of belief were less likely to post comments under the same circumstance. Findings 
in previous studies indicated that the more experience individuals had, the more positive their 
attitudes toward sharing were (Constant et al., 1996). However, this current research found that 
this relationship only applied to individuals who had a strong belief in consistency of design 
knowledge. Even though this finding was unexpected, it is reasonable to believe that those 
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individuals who perceived themselves as experts and had a strong belief in Consistency of 
Design Knowledge might have had more confidence about what they knew and, therefore, might 
not have hesitated to post a comment in the studied community when they had a question or 
needed clarification. This might also explain why those experts with more belief in inconsistency 
of design knowledge were less likely to post comments, since they would have considered that 
there was no single correct answer and that what they knew might only be valid in certain 
contexts. 
As expected, those who had less experience using the software and used the software 
often (daily or weekly) were more likely to share their questions and confusion with the 
community, when they had a weak belief in consistency of design knowledge. However, this 
study found that expert users with a strong belief in consistency of design knowledge were more 
likely to share their questions and confusion than those with a weak belief, regardless of their 
frequency of using the software. According to existing studies, people with belief in consistent, 
certain, and simple knowledge preferred finding a single answer (Bendixen & Hartley, 2003; 
Hofer, 2004; Schommer, 1998). Additionally, these respondents who indicated that they were 
experts might have more confidence about what they knew. As a result, when they found 
confusing content, these experts with a strong belief in consistency of design knowledge were 
more likely to share questions and confusion.  
Interestingly, if the beginners did not use the software often (2 to 3 times per month or 
monthly), what they believed about design knowledge only had minimum impact. Instead, the 
frequency of using the software became more important. The less frequently they used the 
software, the more likely they were to ask questions and request clarification in the studied 
community. This might have been because these individuals held a more traditional view of the 
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firm-hosted community. When they used the software less frequently, these beginners might be 
less knowledgeable about the community and think that the company owns (Lee & Cole, 2003) 
and is responsible for answering questions about its content. In this vein, posting questions on 
the community of practice may have been similar to getting support from the company for these 
beginners, so they might have believed that it was easier to obtain answers and tended to post 
their questions.  
In terms of quality of actual contributions, belief in Consistency of Design Knowledge 
and levels of experience with the software was the only significant interaction. As expected, for 
those who believed in consistency of design knowledge at and above the mean level, experts 
posted higher quality contributions than advanced users, intermediates, and beginners. The 
differences in quality of contributions between different levels of expertise were more noticeable 
when they had consistent design knowledge scores at the above-average level. For those with 
scores at and above the mean level, the more experts and advanced users believed in consistency 
of design knowledge, the higher the quality of the contributions they posted, while the more 
beginners and intermediates believed in consistent knowledge, the lower the quality of 
contributions they shared. These findings are logical, since experts might have had more 
confidence than novices about what they knew as knowledge, and this effect might have been 
amplified when individuals had a stronger belief in Consistency of Design Knowledge. 
Interestingly, for those individuals who had Consistency of Design Knowledge scores at 
below the mean level, novices provided higher quality contributions than experienced users. This 
result was unexpected. Findings in research on expertise—that novices usually focused on 
specific technical features (Calabrese & Marucci, 2006) and that they tended to apply trial-and-
error processes (Ahmed, Wallace, & Blessing, 2003)— provided a possible explanation for this 
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unexpected result. In comments that novices with a weak belief posted in the community, they 
seemed more likely than users with more experience to discover problems in community content, 
especially content with step-by-step instructions. They would often refer to a particular step 
where they found a problem. Individuals with more belief in inconsistency of design knowledge 
were less likely to be worried about the accuracy of their postings. As a result, they would be 
more likely to share what they found in the community and to point out important issues that 
experts might overlook. Accordingly, they contributed higher quality contributions.  
With respect to the quantity of contributions, belief in Consistency of Design Knowledge 
was not a significant explanatory variable; however, its interactions with levels of expertise and 
with years of experience in design were significant. First, when individuals had Consistency of 
Design Knowledge scores at an above-average level, their levels of expertise with the software 
and years of experience in design did not make any difference in the quantity of contributions. In 
contrast, when they had consistency of design knowledge scores at an average level and a below-
average level, as expected, experts usually shared more contributions than novices. The 
differences among different levels of expertise in quantity of contributions were more noticeable 
when they had a weak belief in Consistency of Design Knowledge.  
When experts believed more in inconsistency of design knowledge, they contributed 
more. Many of their posted contributions in the community were related to providing more 
context about their previous messages and to expanding their ideas. This may be due to the fact 
that experts’ comments might be more complex, and their belief in inconsistency of design 
knowledge might drive them to identify the context of their previous posts. This results in a 
higher quantity of contributions from experts. However, the differences in quantity of 
contributions for different levels of belief in Consistency of Design Knowledge became smaller 
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when these experts had worked in the field longer. This may imply that with more experience, 
these experts might have gotten better at explaining concepts, so they did not need to post several 
times to explain the same issue. 
For beginners who had worked less than one year, those with a stronger belief in 
Consistency of Design Knowledge shared fewer contributions as compared to those with a 
weaker belief. This is a reasonable finding, since these beginners might have been afraid that the 
knowledge they shared was incorrect (Ardichvili, Page, & Wentling, 2003). On the contrary, for 
beginners who had worked more than three years in design, those with a stronger belief in 
Consistency of Design Knowledge unexpectedly shared more contributions. These individuals 
knew design content well but appeared to be less competent (i.e., beginners) in using the 
software to carry out their design ideas. Even though they might still have been afraid of sharing 
incorrect knowledge or asking basic questions, their extensive experience in design might 
provide them more confidence and mitigate the fear. This might be more applicable when these 
beginners were looking for answers, since the belief would drive them to find a single answer. 
As a result, these beginners posted more. 
 
Recommendations 
Based on the findings from this study, a number of recommendations for future research 
and practice are provided below. 
Implications for theory and instrument development. 
The present research establishes that domain-focused epistemic beliefs are an important 
element in understanding individuals’ contributions to an online community of practice. In 
addition, the study advances prior research on the beliefs by using the instrument developed for 
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college students in traditional school settings and modifying it for adults in informal training 
environments. An issue to consider in extending the theory to adults is the reliability and validity 
of the instrument. There are two advantages to using Hofer’s DEBQ (2000). First, it is easy to 
adapt to a domain-focused questionnaire. Second, the questionnaire is parsimonious which can 
reduce the effects of fatigue that may arise from answering a long list of traditional epistemic 
beliefs questions. However, the current findings also reveal several possible ways to improve the 
instrument. 
Even though the reliability from this current study is close to that in Hofer (2000) and is 
not particularly low compared to other related studies, future research on the improvement of 
instruments for epistemic beliefs is required. In this current research, only 14 of 27 items were 
used to identify the factors, which resulted in close to 50 percent of items being lost and the four-
factor solution only explaining 34.7 percent of total variance. This is a serious issue across all 
epistemic belief instruments. Future research should focus on clarifying the construct and 
validating the instrument of epistemic beliefs, especially the factors of Attainability and 
Contextual Factuality of Design Knowledge. This process should include reexamining the 
theoretical rationale for different factors, developing items based on the well-defined factors, and 
using more conservative criteria to select items. Such a process might also help to create a more 
parsimonious instrument for measuring individual epistemic beliefs. A concise and reliable 
instrument of epistemic beliefs would help researchers better investigate the relation between 
epistemic beliefs and other variables in different contexts. It could help a study like this current 
study investigate the contributions in an online community of practice using multiple epistemic 
factors. 
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Implications for research. 
A limitation of this current research was that not many participants had made actual 
contributions to the studied community. As Nielsen (2006) pointed out, in online communities, 
90 percent of members are lurkers who never contribute, 9 percent of them contribute 
intermittently, and 1 percent of them contribute most of the content. In other words, this is a 
normal situation in an online community of practice, even when investigating high-traffic 
communities, such as the one in this study. Future research that utilizes the same method to 
review individuals’ actual contributions for a longer period of time than the period in this study 
could gain additional insights and perhaps some novel findings that could add to the validity of 
findings in that study.  
One interesting future research agenda that was beyond the scope of the current study 
would be to conduct a content analysis of contributions to understand the influence of epistemic 
beliefs. In this study, participants’ comments were reviewed in order to understand interactions 
between epistemic belief and levels of expertise in relation to their actual contributions. However, 
a content analysis would have provided a more systematic and reliable way to target the content 
of those contributions. Though people contributing the same quality of comments may still have 
had different types of contributions, such analysis would have been particularly helpful in 
understanding the implications of quantity of contributions, since diverse content may be 
included in the notion of quantity of contributions. A more systematic understanding of the 
specific content contributed by different members may provide some insights for community 
managers about ways to solicit community moderators and organize community policies; as a 
result, they might be able to build more active and healthy communities of practice. 
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Content analysis could also be used to study how different epistemic beliefs might 
influence moderators’ facilitation patterns. The patterns could be discovered by conducting 
content analysis of moderators’ postings. Sinatra and Kardash (2004) found that teachers’ 
epistemic beliefs may influence their teaching strategies. Hence, it is possible that moderators 
with certain types of epistemic beliefs would post more encouraging and perhaps more friendly 
responses. These moderators might be more likely to invite people to actively participate in a 
community, and they might also be the group that administrators would want to recruit. Findings 
from future research could inform community administrators about how to encourage 
interactions between newcomers and old-timers. 
In addition, the online community of practice hosted by a firm is a special type of 
community. It may be hard for its members to separate the relation between the company and the 
community. Especially when the company is for-profit, people may hold higher expectations, 
which may result in different participation patterns. Their epistemic beliefs may also function 
differently in this type of community. Future research that considers group- and organizational-
level factors (e.g., community culture, norms, or reward systems) to discuss an influence of 
epistemic beliefs on individuals’ contributions to an online community of practice hosted by a 
firm is of interest. In the same vein, future research using the same model to explore different 
types of communities, such as an open-source community or a non-profit online community, and 
to take communities’ characteristics and the group-level factors into account could gain 
additional insights. 
Implications for practice. 
Within the two measures of actual contributions, quality of contributions indicates how 
much value is added to the community by each contribution, while quantity indicates how active 
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the community is. Findings from this research showed that quality and quantity of actual 
contributions did not correlate with each other. Furthermore, the regression analyses indicated 
that the two measures needed different explanatory variables to understand the phenomenon. 
One disadvantage of the quantity of contributions is that it cannot indicate anything related to the 
content, other than the user’s activity level. This limitation prompted more investigation into the 
user comments to attempt to better understand the content and find a reasonable interpretation of 
findings from the quantity of contributions. Different types of communities may apply different 
measures to track the status of the community. For instance, a cancer support community might 
care about how many comments they received per day. For an online community of practice 
hosted by a firm, like the studied community, quantity of contributions by itself might not bring 
much information. Two individuals could have the same number of contributions, but those 
contributions might be very different in nature. For example, one could ask five questions, and 
the other could share five useful links to tips and instructions. It might be more important for 
firms to track quality of contributions and number of each type of contributions. It would also be 
helpful if the firm could conduct content analyses of the contributions and track the number of 
each category of contribution. These measures could provide not only insights about the content, 
but also details about activity of each type and category of contribution. 
Based on findings in the current research, a major implication for practice is that 
epistemic beliefs should be considered when designing a community. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
several studies have highlighted the effects of epistemic beliefs on individuals’ learning 
performance (Jacobson & Spiro, 1995) and information-seeking behavior (Aleven et al., 2003; 
Hofer, 2004). Other studies have shown how beliefs influence how well people learn in different 
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types of learning environments (Windschitl & Andre, 1998) and with different types of learning 
facilitations (Demetriadis et al., 2008).  
In order to encourage high-quality contributions, a design that supports beginners and 
intermediates with a belief in Inconsistency of Design Knowledge and a design that supports 
experts and intermediates with a belief in Consistency of Design Knowledge are suggested. For 
example, when beginners and intermediates visit an instructional webpage for a particular topic, 
it may be useful to see other related resources for the same topic or other related topics. The 
suggested design would allow these individuals to cross-reference related sources easily and help 
them find relevant instructions. They could then decide which content is useful. Since they might 
be more likely to read the content closely and find any discrepancies, they may be more inclined 
to provide feedback in the form of high quality contributions. Experts and advanced users might 
be more appreciative if they could obtain the desired content more directly and if less relevant 
content could be filtered out. Hence, a system that highlights suggested content might be more 
helpful for expert and advanced users. Since the design could help the experts find useful content 
easily, they may have an increased opportunity to take advantage of the content. If they see any 
inconsistent content based on their knowledge, experts may be more likely to have high quality 
contributions.  
Increasing both visibility of and participation in a community among users is a major 
challenge. Similar to other online communities, the firm in this study has an enormous 
population of users, and the majority of them are not aware of the online community, limiting 
their ability to take advantage of community content and hindering the development of the 
community itself. Also, one observed limitation in current research is that only a small number 
of community users actually contribute to the community. As Iriberri and Leroy (2009) pointed 
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out, it is important to reach a high number of critical members within a short period of time in 
the growth stage of a community, as they are likely to contribute the majority of the content. In 
addition, based on the theory of communities of practice (Lave & Wenger, 1991), experts are the 
key to creating a healthy and vibrant community. Through interacting with experts, a sense of 
membership and a sense of belonging to the community can be gradually established, and 
novices can become more familiar with the practice and eventually become experts. This is the 
group that usually provides high-quality content to the community. If they could participate and 
contribute to the community on a regular basis, they could become the essence of the community 
and accordingly enhance the value of the community itself. Therefore, in order to increase 
participation among members and the quality of community content, one strategy the firm might 
employ is to reach out to experts based on their epistemic beliefs. By increasing the number of 
experts with belief in consistency of design knowledge, posted contributions might have higher 
quality and interaction between members could be enhanced. Finding critical members who can 
make high-quality contributions to a community is an important issue that all practitioners are 
investigating. The value of the community is determined by the participation of its critical 
members. This current research provides a method to identify these people, and the method is 
particularly helpful when the community is just getting started. 
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Appendix A 
Epistemic Beliefs Questionnaire 
I. Personal Profile: 
 
1) What is your gender? 
___ Male 
___ Female 
___ Prefer not to state 
 
2) What year were you born? (Please enter the 4-digit birth year, e.g., 1950) 
___ 
 
3 Which of the following descriptions best matches your level of experience with using [one of 
the software that developed by the firm]:: 
___ Never Used: I have never used the product. 
___ Beginner: I know of a few features, only some of which I actually know how to use. 
___ Intermediate: I am familiar with enough features to get the job done but I still have a lot to 
learn. 
___ Advanced: I confidently use and understand many of the features and can troubleshoot 
common problems. 
___ Expert: I am highly skilled in most (or all) of the features and can troubleshoot most of the 
problems I encounter. 
 
4) Approximately how long have you worked in the field of [one of the following fields: graphic 
design or Web design]? 
___ Less than 1 year   
___ More than 1 year but less than 3 years   
___ More than 3 years but less than 5 years 
___ More than 5 years but less than 7 years 
___ More than 7 years but less than 9 years   
___ More than 9 years  
 
5) How often do you use [one of the following programs: Dreamweaver, Fireworks, Flash, 
Illustrator, InDesign, or Photoshop]: 
 ___ Daily 
 ___ Weekly 
 ___ 2 to 3 times per month 
 ___ Monthly 
 ___ Less than once per month 
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II. Your Beliefs about the Nature of Design 
 
Instructions: Please answer the following questions as best you can. There is no right or wrong 
answer for the following statements. We want to know how much you agree or disagree with 
each of these statements.  
 
When you are answering these questions, please give us your beliefs about The Field of [one of 
the following fields: Graphic Design, Interactive Design, or Web Design] 
 
         Strongly                                                      Strongly 
Disagree    Disagree     Neutral     Agree       Agree  
Theories are unchanging in the field of 
design. 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
In the field of design, most problems have 
only one right solution. 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
Sometimes you just have to accept design 
solutions from the experienced designers, 
even if you don't understand them. 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
What we accept as knowledge in design is 
based on objectivity. 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
All design theorists would probably come up 
with the same solutions to problems. 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
The most important work of design is 
coming up with original ideas. 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
If you read something in a book for design, 
you can be sure it is true. 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
A theory in design is accepted as correct if 
experts reach consensus. 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
Most of what is true in the field of design is 
already known. 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
Real-life design problems are really 
complex. 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
In the field of design, it is good to question 
ideas presented. 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
Correct solutions in the field of design are 1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
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         Strongly                                                      Strongly 
Disagree    Disagree     Neutral     Agree       Agree  
more a matter of opinion than fact. 
 
 
If design theorists try hard enough, they can 
find the design solutions to almost anything. 
 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
The most important part of being an 
experienced designer is accumulating a lot 
of knowledge about different design 
problems. 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
I know the design solutions to problems 
because I have figured them out for myself. 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
One expert's opinion in the field of design is 
as good as another's. 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
Experienced designers can ultimately get to 
the truth about design problems.  
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
Principles in the field of design are 
unchanging. 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
Principles in design can be applied in any 
situation. 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
If my personal experience conflicts with 
ideas in a book, the book is probably right. 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
There is really no way to determine whether 
someone has the right solution in design. 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
Expertise in the field of design consists of 
seeing the interrelationships among ideas. 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
Solutions to problems in design change as 
experts gather more information. 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
All experts in design understand the field in 
the same way. 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
I am more likely to accept the ideas of 
someone with first-hand experience than the 
ideas of theorists in the field of design. 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
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         Strongly                                                      Strongly 
Disagree    Disagree     Neutral     Agree       Agree  
 
I am most confident that I know something 
when I know what the experts think. 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
First-hand experience is the best way of 
knowing something in design. 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
 
III. How likely are you to post a comment on a piece of content on Adobe.com (e.g. 
troubleshooting documents or video tutorials)? 
       Not at all     Not very  Somewhat     Very      Extremely 
          Likely       Likely       Likely       Likely      Likely 
How likely are you to post a comment, if 
you have a question about using the 
software? 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
How likely are you to post a comment, if 
you need clarification on a help page? 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
How likely are you to post a comment, if 
you find a typo on a help page? 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
How likely are you to post a comment, if 
you disagree with information published on 
a help page? 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
How likely are you to post a comment, if 
you find relevant tips or information from 
other sources? 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
How likely are you to post a comment, if 
you have an idea of how to enhance content 
on a help page? 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
How likely are you to post a comment, if 
you want to share relevant instructions, tips, 
or tutorials that you have created? 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5 
 
Thank you very much for participating! Please click “SUBMIT SURVEY” to finish. 
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Appendix B 
Descriptive Statistics for Items of Epistemic Beliefs 
Table B1 
Means and Standard Deviations of Epistemic Beliefs Items 
Item M SD n 
1: Theories are unchanging in the field of design 2.22 1.073 283 
2: In the field of design, most problems have only one right solution 1.51 .711 283 
3: Sometimes you just have to accept design solutions from the 
experienced designers, even if you don’t understand them 
2.61 1.056 284 
4: What we accept as knowledge in design is based on objectivity 2.82 .997 283 
5: All design theorists would probably come up with the same solutions 
to problems 
1.77 .780 283 
6: The most important work of design is coming up with original ideas 2.97 1.180 283 
7: If you read something in a book for design, you can be sure it is true 1.90 .833 284 
8: A theory in design is accepted as correct if experts reach consensus 2.92 .957 284 
9: Most of what is true in the field of design is already known 2.34 1.026 282 
10: Real-life design problems are really complex 3.21 .968 284 
11: In the field of design, it is good to question ideas presented 4.18 .711 283 
12: Correct solutions in the field of design are more a matter of opinion 
than fact 
3.35 .997 283 
13: If design theorists try hard enough, they can find the design solutions 
to almost anything 
3.73 .925 283 
14: The most important part of being an experienced designer in design 
is accumulating a lot of knowledge about different design problems 
3.70 .936 283 
15: I know the design solutions to problems because I have figured them 
out for myself 
3.16 .911 283 
16: One experts opinion in the field of design is as good as anothers 2.60 .997 283 
   (continued)
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Table B1 (continued)    
Item M SD n 
17: Experienced designers can ultimately get to the truth about design 
problems 
3.48 .855 284 
18: Principles in the field of design are unchanging 2.33 1.062 284 
19: Principles in design can be applied in any situation 3.18 1.015 282 
20: If my personal experience conflicts with ideas in a book, the book is 
probably right 
2.24 .783 284 
21: There is really no way to determine whether someone has the right 
solution in design 
2.79 1.001 284 
22: Expertise in the field of design consists of seeing the 
interrelationships among ideas 
3.90 .753 282 
23: Solutions to problems in design change as experts gather more 
information 
3.95 .668 284 
24: All experts in design understand the field in the same way 1.83 .724 284 
25: I am more likely to accept the ideas of someone with first-hand 
experience than the ideas of theorists in the field of design 
3.78 .876 284 
26: I am most confident that I know something when I know what the 
experts think 
3.03 .903 284 
27: First-hand experience is the best way of knowing something in 
design 
3.96 .803 284 
